~ Il Mio Giornale ~ : Qui Piovono I Ricordi. ღ Ti Permetto Di Sognare

Words Are Weapons

2009-06-18T12:27:01Z

This list will be updated on a periodical basis.

But for the moment, here's a list of some of my fav quotes:

If narcissism and delusions of grandeur were news, we'd all be on the front page

I got so many questions running up inside my mind. Life is long but it isn't enough time, to answer all the questions I got inside my mind. - Jovanotti</b>

Are you in the dark place? Yeah.

You want to know why, I'm so unfocused, so ordinary? You wanna know what happened to me? You.

I'm not dark and twisty. And if I am, it's because I live my life under a banner of avoidance. I avoid. I'm an avoider. - Meredith Grey

There is usually nothing wrong with compromise in a situation, but compromising yourself in a situation is another story completely

Revolutionaries don't fear execution. The death of my physical constitution, is just the beginning of spiritual evolution. God will reincarnate me as revolution

They Feed Us Genetically Modified Garbage So I Repetitively Reload The Cartridge -Immortal Technique

I lived my dreams today, I lived it yesterday, and I'll be living yours tomorrow - The Libertines

These thoughts I must not think of; dreams I can't make sense of; I need you to tell me it's ok. - Editors

Don't be thinkin' that us Asians ain't gonna get you. Since the killing fields, you don't know what we have been through.

>:)

He who learns must suffer. And even in our sleep, pain which cannot forget, falls drop by drop upon the heart. Until in our own despair, against our will, comes wisdom to us through the awful grace of God - R.F.K, Aeschylus

-----With more to come!

Early Spring: It Is My Song.

2009-04-06T06:17:06Z

We're grown ups, when did that happen? How do we make it stop?

- Meredith Grey

I know, it's been forever and a day since I updated my LJ. I've just been busy with life.

School is getting better, I pulled up my grades in my Italian and politics class. I need to join more clubs though. I've been feeling depressed as of late, and I need to make new friends, and get out more in order to amend that.

Learning Italian is a pain, but it'll be worth it. I've pretty much made up my mind that when I do study abroad, I'll head to Italy. I just like the country so much; maybe it's because - to take a cue from Lacan and his syntax here - that I view the culture through an anamorphic lense, but it just seems much more fascinating than the American/Anglo culture I'm currently immersed in.

Mom and I have gotten past another passive-aggressive phase. I did man up and apologise to her, though I wish I could take back some of the things I have said.

As for comics I'm reading: I've just decided to reduce my comics haul to: a few Bat Titles (though the fact that Judd Winick is going to be on the main Bat Book makes me want to vomit) Wonder Woman, Secret Six (I just love Gail's writing) and anything featuring Helena Bertinelli and Carol Danvers. I might branch out and read Teen Titans, Outsiders, and Fantastic Four, but we'll see.

I have already dropped Trinity (it's too boring) and I'm going to drop JLA. I love Dwayne McDuffie, but the "Driving Ms. Daisy" remark that Vixen made to Jon Stewart in the last issue was in poor taste. I'm just not feeling the book now, and I need to save money.

My birthday was on the 27th of March. It was a relatively pleasant and quiet day, though I regret the fact that I didn't get to go to the Crawdad restaurant like I wanted to. I'm 25 now, and I've resolved to make the most of the rest of my twenties.

In the words of Rihanna: Live Your Life.

On another note, here are two songs I really like atm:

Here's a link to the translated lyrics.

I love the song. It's about being young, in love, and full of promise.

And this song:

I'm a bit embarrassed to admit I like it, as I usually frown upon admitting to Top 40 fare. But it is addicting, and nice to dance to after you've a few Red Bull and vodkas.

So that's it for now. I'll catch up with you more later.

A Classic Case Of A Double-Standard:

2009-01-25T02:44:31Z

http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2008/08/22/sienna_miller/

Getty's not getting off scot-free, either: Perez has called him "Daddy With Dick for Brains" and "The Adulterer," also writing "shame" over his face in pics. But somehow Getty mostly manages to keep his own last name in Perez posts while Miller is referred to just as "The Slut."

None of this, of course, is any different from what happens in high schools, offices and elsewhere across the country every day. Broadsheet checked in with Leora Tanenbaum, author of "Slut!: Growing Up Female With a Bad Reputation," who called the harassment of Miller "a classic case of the sexual double standard: Boys will be boys and girls will be sluts." She wrote in an e-mail:

The striking thing, of course, is that Sienna Miller is called a "slut" even though the man she's involved with is the one who has transgressed by being unfaithful to his wife. This incident exposes the most troubling aspect of the sexual double standard, which is that it often leads to violence, sexual or otherwise, against women. Her home was vandalized, a scary situation that serves as a warning: Next time, we might break into your home and hurt you.

Unfortunately, Miller's not the only actress cursed with tabloid slut-bashing wrath: Jezebel's "Missdemeanors" feature has dutifully chronicled other victims of Perez Hilton's double-standard-filled, finger-wagging ways. Seems like it's not going to let up, either (Britney, Christina, Miley). As long as we devour the gossip magazines and blogs, propping up the sexual double standard with slut-bashing will stay a pile-on sport.

I've tried to explain to people - over and over again - why the sexual-double standard, and the words that are used to prop it up, are quite harmful. And yeah, I've gotten really frustrated and angry over some of the bull**** arguments I've encountered, in response.

But for various (easily refutable) reasons, some people just don't want to get it. And it's really not that hard to comprehend. I understand the whole concept of applying the pejoratives to members both sexes (who behave promiscuously), but the problem is, the words carry more weight for one gender, than for another.

I do feel as if some people have to have it drilled through their skulls.
Well, I guess I have to be the one holding the drill, then.

And I know that it's an uphill battle, but it's one I'll continue to be apart of, no matter how much it may frustrate me, and wear me out.

Article Three: Geneva Conventions

2009-01-18T22:47:19Z

I've been doing some thinking. Again:

OHCHR

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

(d ) Attempt to commit genocide;

(e) Complicity in genocide.

So what's happening to the "jungle Hmong"* in Laos is a form of genocide.

*It should be noted that the "jungle Hmong" comprise a small percentage of Laos Hmong population, which is estimated to be around 450,000.

It should also be noted that Laos is a victim of genocide as well; during the wars of the late Sixties, and early Seventies, the United States dropped over 3 million tons of bombs on us, and both the Americans and the Soviets sponsored a war that took the lives of around 350,000 people.

Non-state actors - such as rebel opposition groups, local militias and warlords, as well as vigilante and civil defence groups - can be equally, as guilty as genocide (see Sudan for example.)

So the 'insurgents' who (as noted here) shoot Buddhist monks or plot to overthrow a government, are just as guilty as the official, state actors, according to the aforementioned Article III.

I want to get all nit-picky here and say the word "genocide" may be used too broadly, and can be used in the incorrect context. But when a spade is a spade, and the facts are undeniable, you can't call it otherwise.

I guess a lot of state and independent parties are guilty of acts of genocide. The sad thing is, some states are criticised more severely than others, due to the fact that they lack wealth and significant geo-political influence.

And even more sad is the fact that most of the parties who engage in acts of "genocide" will never be held to account for their crimes.

GO FOR VERONICA!

2009-01-17T23:01:13Z

It's official:

Veronica Mars movie is a-go!

http://www.ifmagazine.com/new.asp?article=7452

OMFGOMFGOMFG lljklfmdfml YAY!

On Race, and Racism:

2009-01-16T08:04:54Z

Racism, as we know it, is a result of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment marked an intellectual shift defined by an enthusiasm for organizing and understanding the world through secular reason.

This shift coincided with a geopolitical expansion that made Europeans far more cognizant of human differences throughout the world. It also drove people to categorize the diversity of life on Earth, especially in the arrangement of human difference.

Unfortunately, the need to 'categorize' had unintended effects, such as giving way to psudo-science which tried to prove how one race is 'superior' to the other; it reinforced the 'us against them' distinction amongst some by placing an emphasis on the distinctions amongst the races.

I tend to agree with the notion that race is a social construct.

There has been an attempt to classify race as a form of taxonomy, but that has run into several problems:

1) The various degrees of overlap (or lack of it) required to establish different groups.

2) The meaningful or required levels of divergence which would legitimize distinguishing subspecies.

3) The corollary requirement that the taxonomic schema have predictive
value.

Furthermore, the advances of molecular biology and a better understanding of evolutionary processes have made it clear that the concept of “affinity” has many dimensions, especially for humans; a given individual or population may have multiple “relationships.”

The commonly known morphologically based “taxa” of humans (“races”) fail to capture, describe or explain the variation found in extant humans from several vantage points.

The classical race paradigm, in operation and concept, is informed by typological thought; the idea that reality is composed of underlying eidos (essences or types).

As Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham wrote in her essay "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race": In societies where racial demarcation is endemic to their sociocultural fabric and heritage, to their laws and economy, their institutionalised structures and discourse, and to their epistemologies: everyday custom gender identity is inextricably linked to - and even determines - racial identity.

As a fluid set of overlapping discourses, race is perceived perceived as both arbitrary and illusionary while natural and fixed by others.

Race serves as a "global sign", a "metalanguage" since it speaks about - and - lends meaning to a host of terms and expressions, and to aspects of life that would otherwise fall outside of the referential domains of race. By continually expressing overt and covert analogic relationships, race impregnates the simplest meanings we take for granted, and has permitted it to function as a metalanguage in its discursive representation, and construction, of social relations.

The concept of race, in its verbal and extra-verbal dimension - and even more specifically - in its role in the representation as well as self representation of individuals in American society ("subjectification"), is constituted in language which - as M. M. Bakhtin (Russian linguist):

"There have never been 'neutral' words and forms that can belong to 'no one';language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions."

More than this, race is an (often times) contested representation of relations between social categories by which individuals are identified, and recognise themselves. The recognition of racial distinctions emanates from, and adapts to multiple uses in society.

The perpetuation and resilience have reflected shifting, often monolithic and (some would argue) essentialist assumptions, the metaphoric and metonymic identifications associated with certain races, the multiplicity of what defines 'race' and 'race' relations make the discussion of the words used to make (and uphold) the 'distinctions' all the more necessary.

However, with all that being said, I don't think we should do away with all of the demarcations we've placed upon ourselves. The distinctions - which are (for the most part) based on biology - are (imo) a natural consequence of biological differences.

Though they can lead to prejudice, they can also serve to highlight what makes a specific group of individuals unique (though I do realise that emphasising traits associated with certain races can lead to broad, inductive statements, i.e stereotypes).

And personally, I like the uniqueness of being an Asian-American.

Sweet Like Candy!

2009-01-13T19:26:07Z

Having turned 16 the year the New Millennium dawned, I suddenly feel a nostalgia for the things I loved during my teen years.

Anyways, here are the things I've been watching, and listening to, but was afraid to admit....

Until now :

Mandy Moore: Mandy wasn't even my fav singer when I was sixteen. Back then, it was Jessica Simpson [cringes in embarrassment]. But I loved Candy, and it's ridiculously innocuous, and saccharine music vid.

It was (seemingly) innocuous, but Mandy managed to pout and preen her way into every dirty old man - or hormone addled teenage boy's - mind(s).

I also love "I Wanna Be With You", where Mandy who - in this track - sounds like she's listened to Jewel one too many times as she apes Jewel's breathy vocal delivery in this song about longing for [paraphrases Veronica Mars] that "special someone".

And then there's N'SYNC. I've been an N'Sync Fan, ever since my fellow 8th grade classmate, Mary, sung the praises of I Want You Back, and Justin Timberlake's behind. >:)

And yes, I was one of 2 million souls who bought a copy of No Strings Attached when it came out. :p

Listening to I Want You Back, and Tearing Up My Heart brought back memories of days of yore, and how I used to wake up early, or stay up late, just to catch a glimpse of N'Sync on whatever television programme they were on.

And finally, there's the television show, Popular. Leslie Grossman's recent appearance on Grey's Anatomy rekindled my interest in this show. Sure, Popular was campy, and over the top, but it was spot-on in its commentary about how much of a burden conforming to the status-quo can be.

Not only that, but it also assailed high school culture, engaging in its own form of deconstructionism of all things that we Americans hold dear, by creating characters with characteristics that are usually not attributable to them (the jock who wants to be the lead in the school play, for example) and using them to deliver commentary on how hard life can be as a teen.

As over the top as I found the show at times, those themes resonated with me. And it was nice to know that I wasn't the only one who felt the way I did.

So there you have it. My little nostalgia trip down memory lane. Take the piss outta me if you want, but, as disposable and inane as these remnants of pop culture may be, they also carry with them a sentimental value; of when things were (seemingly) fresh and new, and when I wasn't burdened with the adult responsibilities, and knowledge I have now.

The Tribe Of Yahweh: Tribalism In The Middle-East

2009-01-12T07:54:11Z

http://www.
salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/01/04/terrorism/

An excerpt:

Still, there is a substantial difference between, on the one hand, basically well-intentioned people who are guilty of excessive emotional and cultural identification with one side of the dispute and, on the other, those who adopt the Goldfarb/Peretz psychopathic derangement of belittling rage over widespread civilian deaths as mere "whining" or even something to view as a strategic asset. The latter group is a subset of war supporters and evinces every defining attribute of the Terrorist.

Those who giddily support not just civilian deaths in Gaza but every actual and proposed attack on Arab/Muslim countries -- from the war in Iraq to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to the proposed attacks on Iran and Syria and even continued escalation in Afghanistan -- are able to do so because they don't really see the Muslims they want to kill as being fully human. For obvious reasons, one typically finds this full-scale version of sociopathic indifference -- this perception of brutal war as a blood-pumping and exciting instrument for feeling vicarious sensations of power and strength from a safe distance -- in the society's weakest, most frightened, and most insecure individuals.

(Sound like anyone we know?)

And honestly, only an asshole would try to diminish the civilian casualties in Gaza.

(Though it should be noted that not everyone who supports Israel's actions in Gaza is not a bad person, they have legitimate reasons for doing so; the ones who diminish the suffering of others are the ones on the receiving end of harsh criticism).

These individuals are usually looking for something to validate their pathology, and to give them a righteous cause; a sense of purpose, belonging.

Excerpt from an article:

Bias on both sides

The test subjects on both sides of the political aisle reached totally biased conclusions by ignoring information that could not rationally be discounted, Westen and his colleagues say.

Then, with their minds made up, brain activity ceased in the areas that deal with negative emotions such as disgust. But activity spiked in the circuits involved in reward, a response similar to what addicts experience when they get a fix, Westen explained.

The study points to a total lack of reason in political decision-making.

"None of the circuits involved in conscious reasoning were particularly engaged," Westen said. "Essentially, it appears as if partisans twirl the cognitive kaleidoscope until they get the conclusions they want, and then they get massively reinforced for it, with the elimination of negative emotional states and activation of positive ones."

Notably absent were any increases in activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain most associated with reasoning

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11009379#storyContinued

Re-enforcing a party line gives them a rush; the re-enforcement of party lines and political affiliation are, aspects of tribalism.

In the Middle East and North Africa, unlike many other parts of the world, claiming tribal affiliation often positively affirms community, identity, and belonging. In the mid-to late twentieth century, nationalist leaders in some regions rejected claims to tribal identity as "primitive" or potentially divisive to national unity. In the early twenty-first century in Morocco, Yemen, and Jordan, tribal affiliations figure implicitly in electoral politics in many regions, although other aspects of personal and collective identity also come into play.

Tribal identities remain important in many regions of the Middle East. They provide the basis for many forms of communal and political solidarity, although never exclusive ones.

Tribal genealogies and identities often employ metaphors such as the parts of the human body and the branches of a tree to symbolize stability, obligation, and belonging, but tribal and lineage identities in the Middle East are social constructs that change and are manipulated with shifting political and economic circumstances.

"Group feeling" ('asabiyya') exists when groups act cohesively, as if compelling ties of obligation hold them together to achieve common interests over extended periods of time.

It is also important to note that:

The fact that one word (tribe) describes a range of ideas about society, and social forms throughout the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world; though it does not make these meanings intrinsically related.

Tribal identity, like other bases of social cohesion - which include kinship, citizenship, Tribal identity, like other bases of social cohesion, including kinship, citizenship, and nationalism - is something that people (and sometimes ethnographers and state officials) create, and it changes with historical, and political context. The first form that the notion of tribe can take is the elaboration and use of explicit ethno-political ideologies, by people themselves to explain their social and political organisation.

A third meaning of "tribe" refers to the practical notions that tribal people implicitly hold as a guide to everyday conduct, in relationg to their own, and other social groups. These notions emerge primarily through social action. Tribal people do not always articulate such notions in ordinary situations, because they are so taken for granted, and because the social alignments based on these notions frequently shift.

A fourth meaning of tribe relates to the analytical conceptions of the term held by anthropologists. Anthropological conceptions are intended primarily to make sociological sense of tribal social relations and often parallel those held by tribal people themselves. They are not more real than tribal people's conceptions of tribe or superior to them; they are a more explicit form of knowledge intended to explain how societies work. The anthropologist's objective is to achieve as adequate an understanding as possible of how people in a given society conceive of social forms, use this knowledge as a basis for social action, and modify these conceptions in practice and over time.

If we were to go by E.O Wilson, then:

The roots of tribalism lie in the initial tendency of humans to seek fitness only for selves and genetic kin (“inclusive fitness”), and in early forms of contractual agreement. Tribalism draws boundaries around the kin group.

1. Tribalism goes beyond inclusive fitness to include the characteristics: concern with territory, uniform appearance, language, religion/culture. Tribalism as an imagined shared community, based on stories of the past.

2. Tribal and state actions that are used to overcome and replace sympathy and altruism: i.e, ideology and state terror. But counter force also possible. The role of emotions and intellect can play a role in countering these exclusive or tribal actions.

So tribalism is about one acting on "proximate mechanisms” just as much as “ultimate desires”.

But Wilson's views have come under a lot of criticism, something I will explore in a little bit.

It is also interesting to view this in light of Norman K. Gottwald's theories about "The Tribe Of Yahweh", where Gottwald, in his structural-functionalist approach, and determanative conclusions, states that:

Israel's origin and social structure were unique, and it is this which is fundamental to her religious uniqueness. The social egalitarian structure of Israeli society brought the Yahwist religious innovation into existence. The Israel of today is the product of this.

Gottwald's dismissal of Durkheim as an idealist and his espousal of the Marxist approach to the understanding of the relationship of religion to society, may make his inclusion at this point somewhat surprising. There ae, however, good reasons for seeing Gottwald in this context rather than in the conflict tradition to which Marx belongs. The distinctive characteristics of conflict theory which understands society within the framework of the interaction of different classes and status groups are wholly absent from Gottwald's study: here Israel appears as a harmonious, undifferentiated unity. Gottwald adopts a functionalist approach to Israelite socity, which certainly has its roots in Durkheimian social theory, and emphasises its synchronic, structural dimension, rather than its diachronic and historical aspects.

On the other hand, while Gottwald quotes Marx in order to establish that religion is an epiphenomenon of material processes, his reading of Marx is selective, and tends to ignore the latter's view that religion originated in a class structured society as an ideological weapon of dominance.

The form of Marxism which Gottwald has adopted is perfectly adaptable to the structural-functionalist approach he otherwise uses. Marx is introduced in order to break out of the spiral of structural-functionalism to reach a decision on which is in the end determanative: religion or material circumstances.

Gottwald's study is a classic statement of the sociological understandings of pre-monarchic Israel within the framework of the Durkheim tradition. The work is dived into two parts: the first is concerned with basic literary and historical questions and culminates in a full and comprehensive analysis of Israel's pre-monarchic social structure; the second compares Israelite and non-Israelite social structures and culminates in a discussion of the religion of Israel and its relationship to its social context.

The literary discussion of the first part covers the sources available and sees the cult as the setting within which the process of tradition formation took place, and where the unity of Israel was brought to real and to literary expression; the historical discussion describes the various models which have been used to understand Israelite origins; the analysis of Israel's social structure was a radical alternative to the social structures of the environment, by means of which there was established an egalitarian mode of agricultural and pastoral life; her tribalism was 'politically conscious' and deliberate social revolution, and more loosely, a civil war in that it divided and counter-posed peoples who had previously been organised within Canaanite city states'.

The second part of Gottwald's work begins with an examination of the existing social structures in Palestine, in order to reinforce the context of internal revolt. The Amarna texts are taken to show a country in turmoil divided between the ruling urban elite, and the subject peasantry.

It is here that the real tension existed, rather than between the semi-nomad and the settle, for semi-nomadism is in fact, a late, marginal development a specialised offshoot of the agricultural-pastoral village community. Israelite origins lie within the latter socio-economic sector, and so Israelites had a strong indigenous rootage in the land. Their opponents 'conquest' of the land were not Canaanites as such, but the city states.

Israel's origin and social structure were unique, and it is this which is fundamental to her religious uniqueness. In a thorough critique of Bright's separation of Israel's religion from her history, and society, of Mendenhall's idealism in making Israel's faith the prior reality which determined her form of society, and of Fohere's reservation of and essential core of Israel's faith immune from historical and sociological analysis, Gottwald argues that religion is a function of society, and a comprehensive symbol system which articulates its totality. The social egalitarian structure of Israeli society brought the Yahwist religious innovation into existence. In turn, the Yahwist religion then acted back upon society in order to sustain fundamental egalitarian social relations to so great an extent that it proved to be the single most significant servomechanism for society.

The relationship between religion and society can thus far be understood within the framework of a structural functionalist approach, but this is not, in the end, satisfactory, for it does not explain which is finally determanitive: Israel's religion or her society. The approaches of both Durheim and Weber are rejected as inadequate, idealist solutions to this question. So Gottwald turns to Marxist historical materialism, and the view ascribed to Marx that 'at the root of all social organisation and mental ideation, is the way human beings within nature act upon nature to produce their means of subsistence and thereby fashion their own social nature' is accepted as being the most 'coherent and promising understanding for developing research strategies in the social sciences'

So the conclusion is drawn that "Yahweh" is the concretised, primordial power to establish and sustain social equality in the face of counter-oppression from without and against provincial non-egalitarian tendencies from within the society.

"The Chosen People" is the distinctive self consciousness of a society of equals created by inter-tribal order, and demarcated from a primarily centralised and stratified surrounding world. "Covenant" is the bonding of de-centralised groups in a larger society of equals committed to cooperation without authoritarian leadership'.

Israel was a cult community whose unity and egalitarian social structure found an ideological expression and value in devotion to Yahweh, within which context she produced a new tradition identifying herself as the people of Yahweh. Her religion a concrete form of expression for concrete social relations anchored in the forms and relations of production; it is to that last context that future research should, in Gottwald's view, be directed, in order to strengthen the base of the cultural materialist approach.

Now, I realise that there's a lot to nitpick with both Wilson and Gottwald (particularly with Gottwald, and his selective reading of Marx) - as I don't agree with everything that they say - but they do raise a series of good points that do make you think.

So it could be - if we were to go by Gottwald - that Israel's uniqueness as a society went on to inform belief, and influence thought, and shape the discourse we currently participate in today.

Pprominent historian Tony Judt informed the readers of The New York Review of Books that "the problem with Israel ... [is that] it has imported a characteristically late-nineteenth-century separatist project into a world that has moved on, a world of individual rights, open frontiers, and international law. The very idea of a 'Jewish state' ... is an anachronism.

Israel was created during an age of ethnonationalism and many of its citizens and leaders are still influenced by it. The country and its government was born from 20th century style of European nationalism and still carries with it the policies and sentiment that helped to shape it. Therefore, it is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that Israeli will make any substantial concessions to Muslim demands. As the regional military power, backed by the U.S., Israel will continue to defend itself from threats and protect its interest in the region."

Two excerpts:

George Orwell: the Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters: Vol 3

"...I have chosen the word "nationalism", but it will be seen in a moment that I am not using it in quite the ordinary sense, if only because the emotion I am speaking about does not always attach itself to what is called a nation -- that is, a single race or a geographical area. It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work in a merely negative sense, against something or other and without the need for any positive object of loyalty.

By "nationalism" I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled "good" or "bad." But secondly -- and this is much more important -- I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. ...

The following are the principal characteristics of nationalist thought: ...

All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage -- torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians -- which does not change its moral colour when it is committed by "our" side. ...

The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. ...

Every nationalist is haunted by the belief that the past can be altered. ...

There is no crime, absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when "our" side commits it. Even if one does not deny that the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified -- still one cannot feel that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function. "

In Memoriam: Ronald W. Reagan; by Peter Brimelow:

I am also very suspicious of this phrase "the political expression of a particular people." What, in the modern world, is "a particular people"? I don't know if I'd classify any of the Western or First World countries as "particular peoples" -- they're all pretty thoroughly mongrelized: (mostly) genetically and linguistically and (universally) culturally. (Japan [which may or may not be considered a "Western" country] is one of the best examples of a genetically "particular" people. Their language is also pretty "particular", though with a base of loanwords from China and a recent admixture of loanwords from Europe. The Japanese culture, on the other hand, has been completely transformed, beginning in 1854, but especially since 1945.)

The aforementioned E.O Wilson he once said the problem isn't religion, it’s tribalism. The two often coincide but they are not the same thing. Religion is not a pernicious force in the world. Tribalism is.

Tribalism itself is not a bad thing. Human beings are tribal by nature.

In Africa, day-to-day village life tribalism operates like the old school tie: helping each other with jobs, introductions and sweethearts, sharing the burden of harvest or building a new house, resolving disputes (whether marital or material) and, not least, fashioning art and music. It is only when conflict erupts that these virtues mutate into a virulent, spare-no- quarter contagion and the wrong tribal scar becomes a death warrant.

Take Nigeria for example: despite its many simmering tribal disputes, the country demonstrates that most of them can be contained and the enmity softened, as long as the political leadership works on the problems.

Moreover, despite Nigeria's diversity, the number of deaths in recent tribal disputes remains modest. Africans are better at forgiveness than most other people.

Going back to E.O Wilson, Steve Rosenthal in his work A Marxist Critique of E.O. Wilson's Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge challenges Wilson's notion that "a deeper cause, rooted in environment and demography", as well as a "population problem" are what led to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

Rosenthal points out that what Wilson omits from his analysis is that Hutus and Tutsis intermarried centuries ago, and there is no biological distinction between them. European colonialists arbitrarily created an ethnic distinction, and used the Tutsi minority to impose indirect rule on the Hutu majority. The IMF and World Bank added to this, by imposing agricultural and financial reforms that shifted land use from subsistence food production, to a focus on export crops such as coffee. European colonialists arbitrarily created an ethnic distinction and used the Tutsi minority to impose indirect rule on the Hutu majority. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed agricultural and financial reforms that shifted land use from subsistence food production to export crops such as coffee.

Though Rosenthal does lose me when he claims that Wilson blames genocide on human nature and overpopulation, to let imperialists and local nationalists off the hook, and thatenvironmental scientists and demographers have shown that famines and wars in Africa are the result of imperialism, not overpopulation.

IMO, overpopulation, and environmental factors - as well as colonialism - all play apart in famine. One single factor should not shoulder all the blame. All of that is responsible for the fact that nationalist leaders in Rwanda recruited, incited, and armed the "teenage soldiers."

So in conclusion, tribalism is apart of human nature. It may have served a purpose in the past - as tribalism had many functions, chief amongst them, to unite groups. Human nature is not abstracted from society, and society is not abstracted from particular societies. Each particular society is held together by shared beliefs, customs, institutions, language, etc, hallowed by time and evolving (usually) without conscious direction.

The conflict in Gaza was no doubt, influenced by tribalism.

And while tribalism may lead to strife, it is not, necessarily, a bad thing.

When tribalism morphs into nationalism, and is influenced by racialist notions, that's when it becomes dangerous. Tribalism, tainted by mans' selfish desires, is the real danger. We should seek to prevent it from causing harm by deconstructing aspects of tribalism, while seeking to emphasise the aspects of it that promote cohesiveness, and strengthen bonds.

You Make It Hard To Smile, Cos You Make It Hard To Breathe: Israel's Actions In Gaza

2009-01-04T11:37:46Z

Israel's actions on the Gaza strip have made me think about the "proportionality" of casualties of war.

I will discuss the morality of Israel's actions in Gaza, using Just War Theory as a criteria.

Invoking collective retributivism has pretty much been the response of a lot of the individuals who demand retribution, in this case, retribution for acts committed by Palestinian insurgents; they invoke it in order to justify the nation's military actions; even ones that shouldn't be defended.

Collectivism counters the liberal charge that if it can be established that the suicide bombers' are not logically responsible for their actions - and is therefore not morally responsible - the traditional argument against meting out punishment on an individualistic basis fails.

The agents' capacity to choose and to act independently of others is limited; - it follows that the moral responsibility (of others) for the agent is likewise, diminished. The collectivist argues that if the agent is acting non-volitionally, that it is possible for responsibility to be attached to antecedent agent, and - presuming no psychological disorder makes an individual react in ways beyond the control of the will - such agents' could be members of his (or her) society who command such actions, and who are thus in a position to inculcate the beliefs generating the destructive mentality of the one perpetuating the attack. In other words: groups which directly or even indirectly support the actions of the suicide bomber are justifiable targets for punishment.

The arguments for collective retibutivism has many faults, one of them being the fact that it ignores the agents' capacity to think for themselves: in choosing to comply with the choice that one makes when they decide to blow themselves up - it is, essentially, an exercise in choice (acknowledging that fact, in no way, excuses the crimes of the "self-sacrificer", nor does it mean to imply the re-enunciation of one's will was the "right choice.")

Moral responsibility is thus accorded to the agent who acts on their own accord, and who knows that choices that are available to them, and is capable of choosing; though we should never ignore the outside factors that led the individual to make that decision for themselves.

In bello (as in Jus In Bello) proportionality seems to allow a nation to kill virtually any number of enemy soldiers in order to protect itself. But the "necessity condition" of the doctrine forbids killing them wantonly, or for no military purpose (though it could be argued that eliminating enemy soldiers now will prevent them from taking lives in the future).

The in bello proportionality condition says the "collateral damage" of killing civilians is forbidden, if the resulting civilian deaths are out of proportion to the relevant good one’s act will bring about; excessive force is wrong, according to the principle of double-effect.

The question then becomes: Who in particular is to be a just target? Is it the society as a whole? But defining a society is intrinsically problematic, given overlapping loyalties and beliefs. I just don't agree with the sentiment that we have to blame an entire culture for the actions of a few individuals.

Supporters of the "statist view"* can cite the act-omission doctrine - which states that those who do not act to prevent a crime from happening are just as guilty as those who commit the crime - but the problem with the act-omission doctrine is it seems to imply guilt by association; not to mention the fact that how one is supposed to go about "preventing a crime" is controversial. And that's been demonstrated by the debate over whether or not Israel did the "right thing" in regards to Gaza.

*The "statist" view states that, just as an individual may kill an assailant just to protect his existence, the state may take lives in order to defend itself, but not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation. It should be noted that some of the things I have presented here could be used to justify a military action, but not in this instance (imo).

The "statist" view has been criticised on the ground that all rights ultimately, belong to individuals; any rights states have must derive from and concern the rights of their citizens.

This “individualist” view has important practical implications, but it also tightens the relations between just war theory, and the morality of self-defence, making the former not just parallel to, but derivative from the latter.

If the only just cause for war is to protect the rights of individuals then legitimate military action is always an instance of defending individuals; if the state acts legitimately only when it acts on authority given to it by its citizens (as many liberal theories hold) then any limitations on their enforcement of rights must extend to their own.

The most-noticed practical implication of the individualist view has been for humanitarian intervention. Whereas the 'statist' view forbids armed interference by one state in the internal affairs of another, the individualist alternative allows such intervention to prevent serious violations' of citizens' rights by their own government, as in Rwanda (which we, unfortunately, did not intervene in) and Kosovo.

In many versions of Just War Theory, the distinction here turns on the doctrine of double-effect, which says it is more objectionable to intend evil as one's end or a means to one's end, than merely to foresee that evil will result from what one does.

On this reading, the discrimination condition forbids intending the deaths of noncombatants as an end or means, as in terror bombing(s) that aim to demoralise the enemy by killing its civilians; but it does not forbid acts that merely foresee the deaths of noncombatants, as when one bombs an arms factory, knowing that some civilians nearby will, unfortunately, be hurt in the blast.

According to this view, there may be special circumstances- such as Czechoslovakia in 1968 - where the consequences of national self-defence are so catastrophic as to make it wrong, but where resisting aggression will lead only to conventional war; it is considered proportional.

This view makes sense given a traditional understanding of just war theory, according to which, the entities with rights in the international realms are states, understood as indivisible entities, with a status parallel to that of individuals in the morality of self-defence.

But one would like to know what is intrinsically proportionate in these cases, and that is difficult to decide.

The most widely accepted just cause for war is resisting aggression, but there can also be a just cause when one state sponsors, or allows deadly attacks on the citizens of another nation; this was the trigger for the Afghanistan war of 2001. Many theorists now also allow humnitarian just causes, which protect the citizens of another state from violations of their personal rights by their own government.

Two less important ad bellum conditions say a war must be declared by a legitimate authority, and fought with right intentions; three final conditions concern the consequences of war: One says a 'just war' must have some, reasonable hope of success. If there is no probability of achieving the just causes, the war's destructiveness will be to no purpose.

Another says war must be a last resort: if the just causes can be achieved by less violent means such as diplomacy, then fighting is wrong. Last is the ad bellum proportionality condition, which says the destructiveness of war must not be out of proportion to the relevant good the war will do.

Just war theory would be unacceptable if it said there is no objection at all to killing civilians collaterally. It has two conditions which prevent this. The first being the "necessity condition", which parallels the ad bellum last-resort condition. It states that killing solideris and especially civilians is forbidden if it serves no military purpose; unnecessary force is wrong.

The in bello proportionality condition says the collateral damage of killing large numbers of civilians is forbidden if the resulting deaths are out of proportion to the relevant good one's act will do; excessive force is wrong.

The question of whether others' wrongful choices can reduce our responsibility for bad outcomes is vital for the analysis of just war proportionality, but it is very difficult to answer questions decisively. One extreme view says anothers' wrong choice always completely remove our responsibility for resulting evils, but this in effect eliminates proportionality as an independent just war condition. Any time we have a just cause, an enemy's resisting us is wrong, and any evils that follow from the said resistance (namely all the evils of war) are their responsibility, not ours.

On this view, if NATO had challenged the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 despite that nuclear war would result, there would have been nothing objectionable about its choice. This is not an easy thing to accept.

Another, contrary, extreme view, ignores others' agency completely, and counts all resulting evils attributable to other causal conditions they may have. It is not so decisively objectionable, and may be correct, but it is at least questionable when it gives the deaths of suicide bombers and voluntary shields completely unreduced weight. However, there are further views intermediate between these extremes.

I cannot find any abstract argument that favours one view over the rest, nor do intuitive judgements about particular cases yield a decisive result.

Judgments about proportionality in war require empirical assessments that are complex and controversial, because the conditions themselves cannot be formulated in different ways that have different implications, even if one were to be given an agreed upon set of facts.

Second, a view can make this reduction only in some cases, and not others. One possibility is to discount evils only when the intervening choice is by the very person who will suffer the evil. Again, this view may be correct, but it will not be attractive to those who want to discount even a little for involuntary shields, when an enemy refuses to rebuild a devastated infrastructure, and for sanctions.

The morality of individual self-defence permits a person to defend not only himself, but another person, or group whose being attacked. It also
permits people to coordinate their defensive acts, so a hundred act
jointly to defend one. The individualist view makes it natural to see legitimate military action as extending these two possibilities, so in it a large group of individuals act collectively to protect the rights of another group of individuals.

Against the just war (justum bellum) are those of a skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can, or should exist in war. There are various positions against the need, or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if victory is sought, then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained, at a minimum of expense and time.

Arguments from 'military necessity' are of this type: for example, to defeat Germany (during World War II), it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centres; or in the US Civil War, for General Sherman to burn Atlanta.

However, intrinsicists may also claim that no morality can exist in the state of war, for they claim it can only exist in a peaceful situation in which recourse exists, to conflict resolving institutions; or, intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause (the argument from righteousness) is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means necessary to gain a victory, or pursue an enemy.

A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality — and hence just war theories — become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework.

Whilst skeptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter revenges. Unfortunately, we don't see that in the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

Intrinsicists can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war, hospitals and densely populated suburbs, for example. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague, or restrictive.

Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: if more will be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost, the consequentialist cannot but demur, to military necessity.

OTOH, intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no flexibility in war: whether it entails a Kantian thesis of respecting others, or a classical rights position, intrinsicism produces an inflexible model that would restrain a combatants actions to the targeting of permissible targets only. In principle, such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centres.

Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (justum bellum) tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (Jus In Bello). The two are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations, of which I expounded upon earlier.

With that being said - and with all things taken into consideration - I find it really hard to justify Israel's actions in Gaza, given the fact that the good in this matter, is far outweighed by the bad. Over 1000 civilians are dead, including 40 civilians who were "accidentally" bombed while attending a UN sponsored school.

Israel bears some responsibility for the current conflict, as it did maintain a blockage to Gaza, in hopes of limiting the rocket attacks. This caused a lot of suffering and added fuel to already lingering resentment.

While all of that was happening, Ehud Olmert, the PM of Israel is forced out, due to unpopularity. He then gets the PM chair back when the elected person, Tzipi Livni, can't form a coalition government and remain in office, despite not being voted in. That causes chaos on the Israeli front.

It has been speculated that the reason why Olmert suddenly launched this offencive was because he needed a war; he needed a way to deflect from his problems, and to get popular support behind him.

However, the Palestinians do bear some responsibility for this current conflict, as well; despite the Egypt brokered cease-fire, rockets continued to be fired from Gaza into Sdorot and Ashkelon. These rockets were from splinter cells unrelated to Hamas (and by Hamas themselves). Marginalized by much of the world despite being democratically elected, Hamas did not have the resources (and most likely not the desire) to do anything about the rockets that were being launched from their territory.

All of this has led to the current mess we have now. And none of this mess can be justified, and it will take a long time for the wounds - inflicted by both sides - to heal.

The problem is that the first casualty of war is our humanity & our respect for human lives and the manner in which we do not think twice while looking at those pictures of dead people; that for me is the greatest problem with this conflict - Hugo

Don't Become A Monster, In Order To Defeat A Monster

2008-11-20T14:02:14Z

I'm of the opinion that torture does not work. It does not (always) prevent terrorism or procure valid, and useful information.

It is possible to imagine a situation in which a particular form of torture - one that is duly limited, and has oversight - actually has beneficial net effects; that is, it may accomplish the stated goals the proponents of it claim it will. If that were the case, than the pain inflicted is far outweighed by the benefits.

But the scenarios stated above are rarely, if ever, empirically true.

Jean Maria Arrigo (Phd, former APA Interrogation Task Force member) once presented three increasingly realistic models of how torture interrogation leads to truth: the animal instinct model, the cognitive failure model, and the data processing model.

These models expose the rational, mid level, social processes that lead to breakdowns in key institutions like health care, biomedical research, the police, judiciary, military, and the government.

The more damaging social consequences of systematic torture interrogation evolve from institutional dynamics that are independent of the original rationale. Further, a legal, regulated programme cannot eliminate the use of rogue torture interrogation services, because they still serve to circumvent procedural restraints on any official programmes, which sanction the acts.

That is why the actual causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing terrorism must be elucidated, rather than presumed.

Causal models of how torture leads to procured evidence are based on policy studies demonstrating the quintessential element of the programmes design, and implementations of it are based on a (presumably) "sound" causal model, relating input to output.

Two of the three different models:

1. Animal Instinct Model:

In order to escape pain or death, the subject complies with the demands of the torturer. The model fails when the physiological damage impairs the victims ability to convey the truth, and the torturers cannot control the subjects’ interpretation of pain.

Prototypical Interrogation Scenarios:

"Ticking bomb":

Subjects divulge their plans under a sufficient amount torture.

Special Institutional Requirements:

Assistance of medical practitioners, before, during, and after torture sessions.

2. Cognitive Failure Model:

The physiological and psychological stress of torture renders the subject mentally incompetent to muster deception or to maintain his own interpretations of pain. The model fails due to time delays, and the torturers’ inability to distinguish truth from deceit, or delirium.

Fanatics, Martyrs, and Heroes:

Subjects are resistant to coercion by means of pain or threat. What then do you do when the crazy person you're trying to secure information from does not give in? How far - or low - will you go?

Torture may provoke an ordinary subject to yield data (both true and false) on an opportunistic basis. The model fails when the analysts are overwhelmed by data; torture may also have an unintended effect, as it may motivate people to join terrorist groups, in response to hearing of, or being on the receiving end of harsh treatment.

There is also the argument that torture is inseparable from other methods; it is one tactic that may be used, amongst many, in a hit or miss approach. But the argument falters upon the revelation that biases and ulterior motives of the ones instigating the acts of torture may invalidate results, or torture tactics may end up empowering competing entities; by degrading and breaking one "bad" element, you may leave a void that will end up being occupied by an equally as bad - or much worse - entity.

Those who believe in an objective morality reject torture on the grounds that it is "intrinsically" wrong. Those who do not believe in an objective morality, on the other hand, oppose torture by preferring to focus on rules, practices, and entire moral codes, rather than concrete acts; that we should adopt whatever rules, practices or moral codes maximize the good when generally adhered to, and then act in accordance with these 'codes'.

Since only rare cases of torture maximize the good, these theorists would adopt a rule that prohibits torture.

I for one, believe that human rights rest on a sense of the dignity, and the worth of a person.

Part of Kant's humanity principal entails that we treat all people as ends in themselves, as having humanity, and never merely as "means" (as in "means" to be used in teleological gain); it calls on us to reflect on what kind of people we would be if we did not do so.

So the question then becomes: What kind of person do I become if I treat someone as nothing more than a means to my own end? It's not a stretch to say that, by doing so, I would be exiling myself from the realm of humanity.

As was said by a poster on another website: When any country engages in torture, even in self-defense, it makes itself an outlaw state; an outlaw from both international law and the realm of ends.

We should never sink to the level of "wrong doing" we are trying to prevent in order to achieve our stated goals.

In other words? Don't become a monster, in order to defeat a monster.

Of The Death Penalty, And Capital Punishment

2008-11-15T16:09:22Z

The retributivist argument for retribution argues that some killers must be executed in the name of justice.

The retributivist argument for the death penalty is strong, if three conditions hold: First, one must actually believe in the right of human beings to exact retribution for their own sake. Second, one must find the evidence of the defendants' guilt is convincing; third, one must be persuaded that the defendants played a substantial role in the case.

Against this, some strict retributivists argue that the only appropriate punishment for taking a life, is taking a guilty life. The argument goes that no other crime is as irrevocable as murder; the punishment should fit the crime.

However, it is possible to adopt different stance on which kind of proportionality is required by retributivism. Is it merely a case of the most severe punishment for the worst crime, or should it be the case that the punishment is similar to the crime commited?

Retributivism is not tied to either position, though the concept of proportionality comes into play.

The retributivists do at least acknowledge that the instituted form of punishment does not in fact, deter. However, this forms no part for the argument in favour of this punishment; the institution may be justified regardless of this, even if there were not a single case where the stated goals were met.

Exactly how the consequentialist calculus comes into play (when considering this) is not entirely clear.

Consequentialists may argue that the death may bring "closure" to the lives of those affected by the murders, and may even do so for society at large.

There is a milder form of consequentialism; according to which the institution of punishment is justified in terms of prevention, if it inspires other people (who are still alive, and not on death row) to rehabilitate, and "moral education"; even if there are some individual acts of punishment that do not meet the stated goals.

However, even this form of consequentialism holds that it must be the case, in order to justify the existence of it, that punishment in general accompolishes some of the desires cited by supporters; otherwise, it is unjustified.

Appeals to 'extreme' or direct utilitarianism may factor into this; our duty, on any occasion, is to act in the way which will produce actual overall consequences better than (or at least as good as) those that any other act open to us, would produce.

The act-omission doctrine is also taken into consideration.

The doctrine implies that when you let a victim be killed (by not acting at their behest), you let yourself kill a victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, this yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself act. (I would argue that in most instances, the crime would have happened anyway, in spite of the threat of capital punishment.)

So in conclusion, when presented with the arguments, and after weighing them; I must say that I must throw my hat in the lot with the side against the death penalty.

Advocates of the death penalty no longer cite deterrence in their arguments, as it has been proven that, even with the threat of death, it does not in fact, deter crime.

I oppose the death penalty on moral grounds, for several different reasons: The intrincisist in me believes that all human life is sacred, and that we should not consider some life expendable, in order to satiate our need for justice.

The taking of a human life should only be a last resort, implemented only when it is considered absolutely necessary, and all other options have been exhausted.

The problem with the death penalty is the way it is systematically implemented; there are some individuals on death row who may not be deserving of the harshest of all penalties.

If we were to go by the retributivist argument, than sexual predators are most worthy of death. And that opens up a whole new set of problems: Determining who is guilty, and who is not.

And let's be honest here, I feel that there are more people in prison who deserve to be executed than those who are currently sitting on death row; child molesters and rapists, for example. They deserve to die just as much as any murderer does, for the pain they've inflicted upon their subjects, and the mental hell they've imprisoned them in. The scars of being the subject of sexual abuse stay with one for the rest of their lives.

With sexual predators, the evidence is a bit more difficult to procure, hence explaining why those who commit offences that are sexual in nature are rarely, if ever, executed. Contrary to depictions on popular television serials - procuring evidence is actually hard to come by.

There aren't always condoms left behind at the scene; often times, all you have is a testimonial of a witness against that of an offender.

DNA tests which have gone on to exonerate those on death row (some after the subjects have been executed) is a reflection of the problems that come with determining whose worthy of execution, and who is not.

I also worry about the potential implications of allowing a government to "play God", so to speak. I worry about the potential effects of determining who gets to live, and who gets to die.

It worries me, and I do find it repulsive. To me, a better solution would be to take all of the money we are currently spending on maintaining capital punishment, and spending it on programmes that rehabilitate and deter those who commit such offences.

It certainly seems more sensible than quelling our inner Shylock, and longing for our pound of flesh; only to find out that - after receiving the pound of flesh - the problems that led to such heinous crimes are still there, and all of the hurt and pain the perpetrators have inflicted upon us still lingers.

A few more links to consider:

http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-facts/page.do?id=1101088

http://davecoop.net/adp.htm

(Some) Of My Greatest Hits! A.k.a I Got Your Head Fucked Up From The Way I Did It. >:)

2008-11-08T18:47:05Z

Some, not all, cos I'm a lazy bastard. >=p

Anyways, here it goes:

Here are a few posts that I consider to be amongst the best that I have typed, lately:

Link 1.

Link 2.

Link 3.

Link 4.

Link 5.

Link 6.

Link 7.

Link 8.

Link 9.

Link 10

Link 11.

Link 12

Link 13

Link 14

But my best work was probably done in this thread:

Ask A Christian

Read it if you have time to kill (and want a head ache...)

And feel free to give me more flattery...

=p

How do you bounce back when reality batters your belief, and love does not (as promised) conquer all

2008-11-08T18:41:42Z

In that moment you realise that something you thought would always be there will die, like everything else. ~ Editors

Seriously, I've been under a lot of stress as of late.

But things like the fact that Barack Obama won the presidential election have given my normally phlegmatic self a long overdue (and needed) glimmer of hope. I need things like that, and I'm grateful for them, however, or whenever, they may come.

Though the fact that Prop 8 passed in California did take the wind out of my sails. :( But nonetheless, I remain committed to never be broken down, and completely defeated.

I've been broken down, but I ain't giving up. Love will come round.

And here are some other things that cheer me up when I'm down:

First and foremost, talking to people. It helps, and it's always nice to receive assurances, and to know you're not alone.

Writing. It's therapeutic. Ranting does release my bottled up tension. And in some cases, it's a better option than just having at it with people.

Though posting on message boards may drive me round the bends at times, as there are some people who have proven that they can't debate like grown ups, and result to childishly insulting someone just to feel better about themselves and the fact that they can't form a proper response to your posts (because insulting is much easier than actually thinking); I do enjoy the discussions I have on them, and the compliments I receive on some of my posts.

Reading anything involving Helena Bertinelli. I love the Huntress; though my budget may be limited, I purchase anything with her in it.

Currently, I'm reading Joey Cavalieri's work on her 1989 maxi series. It's alright, though I think Helena's costume is garish, and I hate the whole child molestation angle of her origin (it's too WiR for my taste), and not to mention the fact that the artists who interpreted Cavilieri's writing had a tendency to draw Helena as an even thinner version of Jennifer Love Hewitt (as if that was even possible, but apparently, they made it so...)

I'm also enjoying Bedard's work on BOP, though truth be told, the book has taken a serious downturn since Gail Simone left it. I'm also dismayed by the news that BOP will be canceled by next Feburary, mainly cos dammit, I need my monthly Helena Bertinelli fix. >=/

Though I am not happy with the fact that the book is being canceled, I am hoping that there will be an inevitable relaunch of the series, with Dinah returning as a full time, active member; but most importantly, a relaunch that leads to an upturn in quality (with my beloved Huntress front and centre).

*Ends fangirl dream/rant, goes back to topic on hand* :p

T.V: I turn my brain off when watching it.

Listening to music. I'm trying to find places online to download Tiziano Ferro's new album, but I think I may have to end up pre ordering it from Amazon, or Target.

Though I am frustrated, I am not completely upset. I still have Ferro's back catalouge, which includes great songs like Ti Scattero Una Foto, Il Confine, Sere Nere, Mia Nonna, Salutandotiaffogo, Rosso Relativo, Ti Voglio Bene, and a whole host of other songs.

Also, Aaliyah (R.I.P baby girl :( ), M.I.A, Elbow, Black Kids, Pete Yorn, Duffy, Damien Rice, the Purple Hearts, pretty much any song produced by Missy and Timbaland, several R 'n' B acts, and of course, those likely lads from Colchester () help release the positive endorphins my brain needs.

It's just a moment, this time will pass.

Do we have free will?

2008-11-08T18:26:41Z

Modern biology would seem to suggest no.

A study published in New Scientist magazine conducted by Björn Brembs, a neurobiologist at the Free University of Berlin, Germany found that fruit flies display (rudimentary) free will. Brembs put fruit flies into a sensory deprivation chamber; a drum with a white interior, that offered the flies no visual cues to orient themselves.

The flies were glued to a torque meter that measured their zigs and zags as they attempted to fly.

Brembs and colleagues analysed the resulting flight records using increasingly sophisticated models of random behaviour. Were the flies' decisions random, like the result of coin flip? No. Did they fit a coin flip model in which the probability of "heads varied" randomly? Again, no.

Nor could they be explained by a series of random inputs, or a series of random inputs combined in non random ways.

Instead, the researchers found that the flies' behaviour bears the hallmark of chaos – a non-random process that is nevertheless unpredictable, like the weather. No one has yet been able to adequately explain how chaos arises.

Bremb's went on to call it a rudimentary sort of free will, and added that "A more sophisticated version of chaotic control could help human will break free of simple, robotic cause and effect."

The random behaviour exhibited by the fruit flies would seem to indicate that is indeed the case. However, it could just be that the fruit flies were acting on what has been evolutionarily ingrained in them. According to Brembs, "It makes a lot of sense to assume that what we experience is based on components that have cropped up in evolution long before."

The Compatibilist view of free will states that man is affected by human nature, and and cannot choose what is contrary to his nature (and desires.) This view acknowledges man as a free moral agent who freely makes choices, but due to the effects of the "fall" (Total Depravity) man's nature has been corrupted that he cannot discern spiritual things or turn to God in faith, aside from 'divine intervention.'

Contrast that with the Libertarian view of free will, which states that free will is affected by human nature, but man retains the ability to choose what is contrary to his nature and desires. Man has the moral ability to turn to God and believe, apart from "special divine enablement". Open Theism states that God is anxiously awaiting to see what each person will do, for he cannot know ahead of time what decisions we will make.

I fall in neither the Compatibilist, nor Libertarian camp, as they seem to be encapsulated in absolutes. I do however, harbour sympathy for the Compatibilist view (minus the doctrine of Total Depravity.)

As Christine Jewell noted in an essay on Kierkegaard and volitionalism; "'Absolute' willing does not preclude relative willing, but the absolute relation can require renunciation of all relative ends. The subjectively existing individual experiences continual temptation to relate absolutely to the world must continually renew, and resolve. They are relative ends, not willed absolutely."

Saint John Climacus (525–606 A.D) supposes that we can--or should-- will faith; but emphasizes that the transformed person absolutely wills the absolute, to the exclusion of all else (a bit of a contradiction, now innit?) This kind of "absolute" relationship precludes actions that control, or transform one's own belief state (for the purposes of conversion.)

This sort of attempt to control one's own belief state for the purpose of producing faith is analogous to a situation where someone attempts to create a life and frame of mine which, in all appearances, is 'close' to God. As Climacus declares: "True inwardness does not demand any sign at all in externals". The "absolute" relation to the highest good does not follow from external actions. Cultivation of the outward appearance of Godliness can become the end in itself, resulting in the loss of the "absoluteness" of the relation to the "absolute" teleological goal. Climacus remarks "Renunciation of everything is nothing, if it is supposed to merit the highest good."

According to Climacus, a criterion of the type of relationship one has with God is: "The specific sign that one relates oneself to the 'absolute' is, there is no reward expected." (I'd say that's darn near impossible, as we all expect something in return for good behaviour.)

However--he does have a point in that doing things out of a purely selfish motive may be harmful. Willing to believe, directly or indirectly, is a relative willing, and hence a movement away from inwardness, and the "absolute" relationship. To will a belief state, is willing something for the consequences of it, as well.

The "willing" of this type of relationship is the qualitative leap; the will is involved in the process of conversion. The thing is--although "willing" things does play its part-- one does not attempt to "will" the "absolute" in its entirety; for then the "absolute" isn't being willed for its own sake.

In other words? There are some things you just can't control. They just happen. Certain aspects of relationships would be one of them.

And to delve into physics, we are limited by accuracy of measurement, since every measurement will consist of probable values, rather than a consistent one.

LaPlace theorized that if one would have knowledge of every single entity in the entire universe, one could determine the next sequence of events, thus predicting the future (and thus, you have the concept of LaPlace's Demon).

The thing is though, as many in the field of physics have noted, the more accurately you know the momentum of a particle, the less accurately you'd be able to measure its position (and vice versa). This is more than just a practical limitation: it is a theoretical principle. It appeals to ideal measurements as well.

So even if you had a totally deterministic model of the universe, you cannot predict the current state based on a previous state (or a set of measurements) with total accuracy. Thus, any prediction of the state of the universe at a certain time is a probabilistic measure.

Making a segue way, I'd say in place of 'pure' free will, probabilistic causation seems more plausible. An example: A probabilistically causes B if A's occurrence increases the probability of B.

And given that an agent who possesses a virtue is a person who possess it, along with all of the complexities of the human mind, and may even be subjected to a multi track disposition (as opposed to an occurrent belief); than that makes it hard for there to ever be pure free will, or pure determinism.

That's a bit controversial, because probabilistically is usually associated with Quantum Mechanics; and the notion of the 'singularity' disappearing is controversial amongst Christians, as to some, the notion of the singularity "disappearing" seems to suggest that things can pop out of nothing, without the help of a creator being.

I see no reason why QM and a belief in a divine presence should be mutually exclusive, but apparently, others feel differently.

In terms of the view that some beliefs arise directly from basic acts of the will, I fall in neither the direct or indirect volitionalist camp. I feel the same way about prescriptive and descriptive volitionalism, though I do assert that normative elements used in consideration with the necessary steps to acquire beliefs based on non-epistemic considerations seem to be the most plausible.

So in other words, when presented with what we know, we are free to choose; but just how much remains yet to be determined.

Notes On A Life Of Immeasurable Bravery: Vote, Because It's What Jesus Would Freakin Do!

2008-11-04T23:57:38Z

Do it, or else I'll send her to your house...Trust me, you don't want whiny, annoying, self righteous Izzie over at your house lecturing you about how all animals are God's creatures and shouldn't be killed (unless of course, they happen to be your fiancee.)

And this song by the Italian artist Fabrizio Moro reflects the way I feel today, and has me pumped up:

Pensa (Think)

There were men of which pages have been written
Notes on a life of immeasurable bravery
Irreplaceable because they denounced
The most corrupt systems too often ignored
Men or angels sent to the earth to fight a war
Of feuds and of families scattered as so many balls
On an island of blood that among so many wonders
Between lemons and seashells… massacre sons and daughters
Of a generation forced not to look
To speak in a whisper
To put out the light
To comment with silence
Every bullet in the air
Every body in a ditch

There were men that little by little
Have left a mark with courage and with commitment
With devotion against an organized institution
Our thing…your thing… what is yours?
It’s ours…the freedom to speak
That our eyes were made to watch
The mouth to speak, the ears listen
Not only music not only music*
The head turns and adjusts the aim, be clever
At times condemning at times forgiving
Simply

Think before firing
Think before speaking and judging
Try to think
Think that you can decide
Wait a moment
Only a moment more
With your head between your hands

There were men that died young
But they were aware that their ideas
Would last for centuries as important words
Unbroken and real as little miracles
Ideas of equality ideas of education
Against every man that exercises oppression
Against every one against a weaker one
Against he who buries his conscience in the cement

Think before firing
Think before speaking and judging
Try to think
Think that you can decide
Wait a moment
Only a moment more
With your head between your hands

There were men that continued
Although everything around was burning
Because in the end this life has no meaning
If you fear a bomb or a pointed gun
Men passed and a song passes
But no one will ever be able to stop the belief
That justice is not only an illusion

Think before firing
Think before speaking and judging
Try to think
Think that you can decide
Wait a moment
Only a moment more
With your head between your hands
Think

* When Fabrizio speaks of music not just being "music", he means that music can become more than a disposable commodity in our lives. It can become filled with sentimental value, and become a particular snapshot of a moment in time, invoking memories - good or bad - of days gone by. Its power and its beauty lies in its ability to release our emotions vicariously, often articulating the way we feel better than we can, and in its ability to stir the soul; and even make us think.

At least that's my interpretation of it. ;)

But nothing matches the sentimental value of knowing that you were apart of making history. ♥

The freedom to speak is ours. Let's exercise it.

It's Here!

2008-10-08T16:20:25Z

Nuovo singolo, Alla Mia Eta.

I'll have to admit, that at first, I didn't think too highly of the song. To me, it seemed highly derivative of "Tarantola D'Africa" (the first single off of Nessuno E' Solo).

Not only that, but I was hoping that it would be more R'n'B, along the lines of TZN's earlier work.

But after listening to it again, I must say that I am now, officially, in love with the song. The song starts off with Ferro's voice gliding in over the sound of a gently strummed electric guitar, and a tinkling piano. His voice glides in, much like a specter that carries with it the memories - and the full weight - of the past.

The drums and the bass kick in 41 seconds into the song, till it builds up to the rocking chorus. The crescendo comes during the bridge, where it builds up, spurned on by the passion that emanates in Ferro's voice; till it gently lets you down, and you're back where you started. Ferro's voice then trails off, leaving with you the lingering memories of the melody, and events that have transpired over the course of your life.

The climax is thrilling, as it seems to insinuate that - and is a metaphor for - after your highest highs (and lowest lows), in the end, you come crashing down. And when the odds are against you, all you have is yourself to rely on, and to reflect with.

So this song wins, not just because it demonstrates Ferro's strength as a producer, and in his musical arrangements; but in his ability to write unusually deep lyrics, where he explores subjects that most other singers (or hell, most musicians nowadays) won't even touch with a ten foot pole.

It's very Townsend-esque (circa Who By Numbers).

And it's why I love Tiziano Ferro.

Lyrics:

I’m a big faker, while I pretend happiness (to be happy)
You’re the biggest distrust (when I am to be the least trusted, or you shouldn't trust me)
Is when you pretend (fake) sympathy
Like an earthquake in a desert that
That everything will collapses and no one sees that I’m already dead

Everybody knows that in case of danger, (the only one who) is saved (are) only (one) who knows how to fly very well

Cos excluding the pilots, clouds, eagles, airplanes
And the angels, you’re left (alone)

And I ask myself tell me what are you gonna do
Now that no one will come to save you
Thousands of compliments for the life of a champion
Insults by the trace of a mistake

And I feel like (one) who still knows how to cry at my age
And I’m always grateful to (be one) who knows how to cry at night at my age

And (in) my life that, it has given me so much
Pain, love, truth, everything
Thanks to those that know how to always forgive (at) the door at my age

Truth that (is) never easy, has never been
I watched life like a blind man watches it
‘Cos what is said, sometimes damages (hurts you)
But what is written can hurt to death

And I feel like (one) who still knows how to cry at my age
And I’m always grateful to (be one) who knows how to cry at night at my age

And (in) my life that it has given me so much
Pain, love, truth, everything
Thanks to those that knows how to always forgive (at) the door at my age

And that life reserves (for) you what you serve (you get what you deserve), but
That you’ll cry for ugly things and beautiful things and that
That without resentment your fear will become your cure
The lost joy return now and ‘cos
Cos only the chaos of rhetoric
Confused and modifies the historical coherence and
And ‘cos God has suggested to me that I’ve forgiven you
And what he says I do it
At night at my age
At night at my…

(Note: The lyrics in parantheses are ones that I added, in order to clarify the meaning of the lyrics for those who speak English.)

My Cave Is Deep, But Your Light Is Shining Through

2008-09-09T00:42:52Z

Happy birthday, mom.

I love you dearly. Words cannot describe your awesomeness, or how grateful I am that God blessed me with you.

I love your depression and I love your double chin
I love 'most everything that you bring to this offering

I know I've been a liar and I know I've been a fool
I hope we didn't break yet, but I'm glad we broke the rules
My cave is deep now, yet your light is shining through
I cover my eyes, still all I see is you

Oh I know that I left you in places of despair
Oh I know that I love you, so please throw down your hair
At night I trip without you, and hope I don't wake up
'Cause waking up without you is like drinking from an empty cup

I cannot look into the darkness anymore, I can't stand what it does to you

2008-08-14T12:19:23Z

So I did actually venture out of the house - to the cinema, and shell out nine dollars (movie prices in the state of California! Bah!) for two films that I wanted to see.

It's impossible for any film to live up to the hype bestowed upon it, but Dark Knight came pretty damn close to doing so.

The film - as those of us who have seen it know - starts off with a bank robbery conducted by men in clown masks. As the robbery is in progress, the robbers begin picking each other off one by one, thereby becoming the embodiment of Social Darwinism, and alluding to the darker elements in the Batman myth that have been established over the years.

Batman first makes his entrance in a scene featuring Russian gangsters and hyenas - with the hyenas being a nod to the comics. Was it just me, or were the Russian accents in this film just plain corny? I had to stifle my laughter every time I heard a "Russian" speak.

As I type this now; I am reminded of recent events in South Ossetia, and I wonder if the Cold War mentality - aspects of which show up here with the Russians as bad guys - will ever be put to rest.

Michael Caine was spot on - no surprise there - in his portrayal as Alfred, though his Mockney accent made him come across as more of a working class bloke than someone whose been around billionaires all his life.

The action was well choreographed, though there were times when I felt like they were adding in the explosions just to please people who like things that go boom.

The cinematography was great. Visually speaking, the camera did as much work in The Dark Knight communicating elements to the audience as the dialog did. It was never over the top, nor gimmicky. Each shot felt purposefully selected to aide in communication the underlaying emotions and experiences of the characters on screen; while at the same time, giving us a sense of vastness to the scope of the shots.

Batman was at his darkest during the 1980's, when - in the Dark Knight Returns - Frank Miller wrote a Batman who dwelled in a world that was nothing short of dystopian - as a cynical, over the hill, entropy believing Batman was the only hope that the world had. The style that the Dark Knight was filmed in definitely paid homage to that era.

Noir began in the postwar era, and was caught up in the disillusionment of the time. It heralded the coming of more explicit crime literature.

As Nolan himself said: "If that’s true, that’s great, because I really wanted to use the structure of the movie as a way of reawakening some of the things that used to be so valued in the genre: the paranoia and exaggeration in our everyday insecurities."

Paranoia was thematically recapitulated through the film - and it took on several different forms, from Batman using Lucious Fox's 'cell phone sonar' technology to somehow turn every single cell phone in Gotham into a sonar device (very much reminiscent of the Bush Administration's wire tapping) - to the several assassination attempts on various leaders; even to the corrupt business man Lau as a villain (as China is now seen as a major competitor for influence on the global stage.)

Speaking of which; I loved Morgan Freeman's performance as Lucious Fox. He didn't over act or try to steal the show, he just played his role to the best of his ability. And good on him for doing so.

In an informal structure, it's impossible to separate the role from the person, and - as participants enter and leave the system - their roles develop and change as a function of their personal characteristics.

Heath Ledger's Joker is the best example of this. The way that Heath seemingly transmogrified into this madman was nothing short of sheer brilliance. I myself was at times frightened and taken aback by his portrayal. It's hard to believe that this was the same Heath who sang "Can't Take My Eyes Off Of You" in 10 Things I Hate About You.

Ledger's Joker also has all of the characteristics of a Dostoevskian anarchist; or one who engages in anarchy for the sake of it. In the book Demons, the organisation of one of the protagonists, Pyotr (who was a clear parody of real life Russian anarchist Sergei Nechaev), is a satirical and often amusing blend of chaos and extremism.

The individuals involved in the organization - the vocal representatives of nihilism - are severely flawed and are largely unsympathetic characters. And so was Ledger's Joker. The revelations of the Joker's past - the anecdote of being a victim of his father's abuse, the story about his wife - made the character more human, and made his actions a bit more understandable - as pain was used as a motivating factor (though there should be a delineation between understanding and justification.)

I can't help but wonder if playing The Joker - along with the other demons in his life - led Heath to spiral into a King Lear like descent into madness. Well, okay, maybe not that bad; but one can't help but wonder if playing The Joker - and getting inside his perverse head - may have been the reason why he was swallowing "dolls" in order to help him relax.

In stark contrast, there's Aaron Eckhart's Harvey Dent.

I do admit that I rolled my eyes when Harvey first came unto the screen. The whole pulling a gun out of the hitman's hand in the courtroom was just corny, and something straight out of the WWII comics from whence Batman came from.

Dent consistently refused to give into the corruption that is so pervasive in Gotham City, and was so dedicated to his job that he even went as far as to interrogate Jim Gordon on his relationship with the Bats (though the Batman's actions were actually beneficial to Gotham, and ultimately, Dent.) He was therefore seen as a symbol of "hope", a beacon of light in Gotham's dystopian darkness.

The fact that he was seen as a symbol of light makes his fall even more tragic.

The scene where they are transporting Harvey after the press conference where he reveals himself as the Batman, to me, had eerie parallels to Iraq. The explosions and the scene where a police officer yells "I didn't sign up for this!" made me think of what's going on over there, now.

One could even make a case that the Joker was an allegory for the "insurgents" (though if you do, you'll make me puke by oversimplifying something that should not be simplified.)

Dent's actions - where, in one scene, he is seen wanting to use excessive force on a suspect - also make me think of the ongoing debate about the usage of torture. Dent would fall on the side of those who think that torture is the best way to procure information, while I fall on the side of The Dark Knight and say, no, it is not.

The tragedy that ultimately transforms him from white knight to madman is the death of his fiancée, Rachel Dawes. Indeed, the scene was the epitome of bitter sweet as Alfred reads Rachel's final letter to Bruce, while both Harvey and The Bats are dealing with her precipitous demise.

I can't wait to see how Dent gives into his madness in later films. Whereas Tommy Lee Jones Two-Face was cartoonish; Nolan seems to use tragedies as a motivating factor, thus making their actions more understandable.

Two-Face's dualism is almost binary, or better yet, dialectic. The two sides of him seem to be in a constant push pull for the truth. The dualism in him seems almost dualist in the substance vein.

Alfred seems to live his life under a banner of avoidance as well (or at least wants Bruce too! ;)) as he burns the letter Ms. Dawes wrote to him, before Bruce could read it.

I'll admit that I didn't like Maggie Gyllenhal's performance too much. She just seemed a bit too vanilla, and to be honest, boring. She really was not that much of an improvement over Holmes. And I will get catty for a second here and say - with all the beautiful women around him - Bruce couldn't find a better love interest? >:p

Gary Oldman was spot on as Jim Gordon.I'm still amazed at how much he resembles the Year One Jim, and how Barbara does, as well; though the addition of the infant who has grown into a child was a deviation from Frank Miller's original work.

As for Christian Bale's performance as Batman; I think Bale is a good actor. My only two nitpicks are: Bale's gruff voice. It irritated me, and I wanted to give him a lozenge for each time he spoke. And the fact that - unlike Keaton's Batman - he doesn't convey the same sense of inward pain that Keaton's Batman did.

Batman is a classic Byronic hero - as he exhibits all of the characteristics of the archetype - but Batman also shares similarities with the Russified Byronic hero, as well as the classic English one.

The Russified Byronic hero, developed primarily by by Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, Alexander Pushkin, and Mikhail Lermontov, has their own set of unique characteristics. Pushkin - with Eugene Onegin - creates a romantic hero who carefully crafts his own isolation by rejecting romantic happiness, then dwelling on his own lonliness.

As in the case of the earlier Russian Byronic heroes, Dostoevsky's Rodion Raskolnikov’s isolation is not physical, but stems out of his mental isolation, and the feeling of superiority over the society in which he lives.

This superiority is not only what spurs Raskolnikov to prove himself with his crime (or in Batman's case, fighting crime) but is also what allows him - in a sense - to play God. While Raskolnikov does so by deciding who is not worthy of living, Batman does so (in a way) by being a total control freak.

One example of this is when Batman dangles the Joker over the edge of a tall building. He has the Joker's life in his hands, and he could end it all, simply by dropping him to the ground. But he doesn't, thus reinforcing my belief that at times, Batman may adhere to the Kantian notion of duty.

*For those of you not familiar with Kant: For him, "duty" was not "moral" if one derived pleasure from it. And Batman certainly derives no pleasure from his work.

The individualism of the Byronic hero exalts man as being his own God, thus taking God out of the picture.

While dividing people into those worthy and unworthy of living allows Raskolnikov to place himself at the pinnacle of "Byronic arrogance"; for Batman - it is, in the words of Clark Kent in The Dark Knight Strikes Again - his "bottomless ego" which allows him to do so.

Raskolnikov’s feeling of superiority also isolates him from his peers, which in turn, feeds his pride. While Raskolnikov was Dostoevsky's way of parodying the Byronic hero (he takes the mick out of a lot of people now, doesn't he? :p); aspects of the hero are attributable to Batman. Though I think a better, and a more apt comparison to Raskolnikov may be The Watchmen's Ozymandias (though that should be a subject best left to explore in another post.)

Don't get me wrong though - I'm a huge fan of The Bats. I just find the parallels between the two striking, as well as worth mentioning.

Batman loses the love of his life, and I - once again - being a sucker for the dark and twisty, feel sorry for him, and wish I could take away all of his hurt and pain. (Can you blame me? ;) )

As for the ending; I'll echo what has been said already; and say that the ending left much to be desired, and many questions unanswered.

My nit picks about the ending: First of all, if Batman is, as he says, trying to "inspire hope"; then why dash the faith of the people by sullying your own name by claiming "responsibility" for all of the crimes Dent had committed? You mean to tell me that he and Gordon could not have blamed the Joker, his henchmen, or heck; the Russian gangsters with their bad accents, or hell, just come forward and be honest about what Harvey did?

I suspect that Batman asked Jim to do that for two reasons: Penance, and to not dash the hopes of the people. Penance, because he feels guilt for what happened to Dent, and Dawes - and purposely taking the fall for Dent in order to make sure that the one man in Gotham who the people could believe in, would not become completely cynical and lose faith.

I guess Alfred's not the only one here who's all avoidy.

The ending was the only blight on an otherwise superb film, and yes, I am open minded to believe that aspects of the ending will be addressed in the films that follow this one.

Anyways, that's my long ass analytical review of The Dark Knight. Belated, I know (shut up.)=p

Maybe I'll do The X-Files next. I'm just glad that I stopped procrastinating and got it done.

And here's my song for this review:

One of the few, good songs that joke of a group Babyshambles has recorded!

And lord, someone needs to deliver Batman from his misery.

(Oh please let that be me....)

Three Words, Eight Letters, And I'm Yours

2008-08-14T02:25:22Z

The power of words.

Lately, I've been thinking a lot about it.

Take the words "slut" and "whore", for example. The very utterance of the words never fail to make me grit my teeth; mainly due to the fact that the words are tied into the sexual double standard.

Due to the fluency of language, the word slut has evolved from it's original meaning of “dirty” to mean a demeaning word for sexually active women, and the word “whore's” etymology can be derived from the Danish word “hore” and the Swedish word “hora”, both meaning “one who desires.”

Somewhere along the way, the terms were misappropriated to refer to sex workers, and later women who were deemed sexually promiscuous. The stigma against sexually active women is largely a societal construct, though it should be noted the stigma was not a concept largely confined to the monotheistic religions, but has its antecedent in earlier civilizations (See Ancient Greece as an example.)

The biological differences between men and women have no doubt been instrumental in shaping this train of thought. Men are physically stronger, and therefore it is only natural that they would be the ones in charge of society, (and not to mention exalting their own virtues.)

Men are the hunter gatherers, and they go off to war to defend their progeny. If ever a nuclear holocaust should happen, one man, provided he is healthy and fertile is all that is needed to repopulate the earth, while several women will be needed to carry his offspring. It is this biological quirk that is also the main reason for the delineation between “slut” and “stud”. Men are celebrated for being able to repopulate, while women are expected to adhere to prudence and save themselves.

It wasn't always like this, though. In Ancient China, women were said to possess an unlimited supply of yin, while men were thought to have a limited supply of yang. Masturbation for men was frowned upon, while women were able to masturbate freely. Women were free to engage in homosexual relationships. Superstition, at the time, also promoted the belief that for a man to give into his yin before allowing a woman to give into her yin led to health problems, even death.

Prostitution was also accepted, as it was said that men could gain or reacquire lost yang from sleeping with women who have had multiple partners.

The introduction of Confucianism and later Buddhism into society led to a curtailing of sexual freedom for women in China.

In Mesopotamia, Ishtar was the celebrated goddess of love and fertility, and women were encouraged to engage in ritual sex ("Temple prostitution") at least once in their lives. the shift from an emphasis on matriarchy to patriarchy and an gradual rise in influence of the Abrahamic religions led to the practice of sacred prostitution to be banished with altogether.

The fear of women gaining equality is one of the main - but largely under addressed factors - in this double standard.

Now I'm not saying that everyone who utters the words is intentionally perpetuating the double standard. I've made that accusation in the past, and am now retracting it, along with the insults I have hurled towards other people. (Sowwy.)=(

Jean Paul Sartre (whose works I will also cite later) said that, by separating act and thought; Sartre insists that consciousness only comes after the act, for consciousness itself is unthinking, and can only acquire meaning and content once reflected, i.e, in terms of an act (objectification of the will).

As I noted in an entry incorporating phenomenology: Martin Heidegger argued that in practical activities, we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore, some psychoanalysts have stressed that much of our intentional mental activity is not conscious at all, but may become conscious through the process of therapy and interrogation. An ideal meaning would be the engine of intentionality in acts of consciousness.

In other words? Most people are not aware of what have become habitual activities for them, that is until someone else points it out to them.

And even after examination, I can't blame people for using certain words (as much as using them may annoy me.) Being an idealist is hard.

Tying into structuralism comes the concept of the meta language; with meta-language being a technical language, devised to describe the properties of ordinary language.

In Roland Barthes Mythologies, there are two semio-logical systems, one of which is staggered in relation to the other; a linguistic system - the language - which Barthes calls a "language object", because it is the language which "Myth" gets a hold of in order to build its own system. which Barthes calls language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system.

Many paradoxes, including - debatable - the Liar Paradox, arise from a failure to distinguish object language from metalanguage. Expressions involving true or false - when applied to a sentence - must always be expressed in a metalanguage - and not the object language of a sentence.

To Barthes, one of the peculiarities of myth is that it is not only constructed from a semiological chain; it contributes to such chains of meaning, in which a meaning at tone state of the chain is hollowed - or emptied out - in the ensuing stage so that it might be turned to work as a signifier of yet another meaning system; thus highlighting the danger of a second-order semiological system.

It cannot give a full interpretation of the image being used, but rather demands a partial and one-sided translation of that meaning system. Hence, to Barthes, myth is seen as a distortion of history, a metalanguage that can give the image of a whole without any explanation as to its roots, formation or mystification. Myth is seen as the appropriation of an historical image that survives in gesture as a mode of signification, rather than as a shared memory.

The Natural Semantic Metalanguage, is about breaking concepts/words down into combinations of simpler concepts/words (examples: plants: living things/these things can't feel something / these things can't do something.)

The sign (signe) is described as a "double entity", made up of the signifier, or sound image, (signifiant), and the signified, or concept (signifié). The sound image is a psychological, not a material concept, belonging to the system. Both components of the linguistic sign are inseparable. The easiest way to appreciate this is to think of them as being like either side of a piece of paper - one side simply cannot exist without the other.

As Michel Foucault wrote, societies engage in a "perpetual process of strategic elaboration", or "a constant shifting and reforming of the apparatus of power in response to their cultural and economic needs." Words play a part in that, whether through political discourse (we are at war with EastAsia!), and even to everyday colloquial usage, helps to shape the structures of our current society.

As Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham wrote in her brilliant essay "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race"*, in societies where racial demarcation is endemic to their sociocultural fabric and heritage to their laws and economy; to their institutionalised structures and discourse, and to their epistemologies; everyday custom gender identity is inextricably linked to - and even determines - racial identity.

*Brilliant, though I disagree with her on the notion of race as purely an ideological construct. It is biological as well.

As a fluid set of overlapping discourses, race is perceived perceived as both arbitrary and illusionary (see Sartre's work) while natural and fixed by others.

Race serves as a "global sign", a "metalanguage" since it speaks about - and - lends meaning to a host of terms and expressions, and to aspects of life that would otherwise fall outside of the referential domains of race. By continually expressing overt and covert analogic relationships, race impregnates the simplest meanings we take for granted, and has permitted it to function as a metalanguage in its discursive representation and construction of social relations.

M. M. Bakhtin (Russian linguist) once used the phrase "the power of the word to mean." This power evolves from concrete situational and ideological contexts; that is, from a position of enunciation that reflects not only a particular time and place, but values as well.

The concept of race, in its verbal and extra-verbal dimension - and even more specifically - in its role in the representation as well as self representation of individuals in American society ("subjectification"), is constituted in language which - as Bakhtin points out - " there have never been 'neutral' words and forms that can belong to 'no one'; language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions, and accents."

More than this, race is a highly contested representation of relations power between social categories by which individuals are identified, and recognise themselves. The recognition of racial distinctions emanates from, and adapts to multiple uses in society.

Going back to Bakhtin, he argues: "Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world." Race has conflicting meanings (heteroglossia) expressed by different groups.

The (at times) perpetuation and resilience have reflected shifting, often
monolithic and essentialist assumptions; as well as the metaphoric and metonymic identifications associated with certain races, and the multiplicity of what defines 'race' and 'race' relations make the discussion of the words used to make (and upheld distinctions) all the more necessary.

Going back to Sartre - he saw language is an instrument for transmitting languages and information. Georges Bataille (also a 'Continental' philosopher) saw it as - in Pierre Klossowski words - the code of everyday signs that always conditions expression and limits transmission.

He used words to break through this code so as to give voice to that "which is beyond language"; to the sacred, aiming to draw the reader into the "ineffable", into a place where reason founders. Because Bataille was trying to give voice to the ineffable; "Inner Experience" needed to be a synthesis of rapture, method, and intellectual rigour.

When Antoine Roquentin (protagonist of the hero of Sartre's La Nausée) attempted to relate his story as the meaning of his life; he found that he suffered from the "absence of a certainty in language."

Roquentin seizes upon perceived limitations through the use of words; the absence of the 'middle way' between non-existence and the abundance of things is identified as the absence of the naming, the identifying of action, and the process of becoming free that Sartre formulates later in Being and Nothingness.

These are the words which define being as distinct from simply existing. Words come as the writing of this history (specifically personal history, as in my history) takes shape and therewith the meaning of my being as essence. For until I am able to define the process of this becoming in the form of a story that I can relate to and through which I can objectify my being as consciousness. I merely exist as empty consciousness.

It comes to appear that individuals need language - as distinct simply from disjointed words - to identify and define the content of their essence. The self is constituted in the totality of words defining its moments of 'becoming'.

As such, the words uttered to express the first moment of an acted consciousness cannot be taken as final, and will have to wait until this self ceases to act, collects the essence of all previous actions in their totality, composes one last narrative that may be used to define it.

Hence, words, although not defining the immediate empty self, do arise, and are indeed necessary - as Roquentin suggests - for the recognition and the knowledge of this lived life.

Sartre poses another problem regarding language; for in this distinction between existing and being, the existentialist angst appears as the absence in the nature of naming "What. I. Am."

In La Nausée, what frightens and nauseates Roquentin is the recognition that while he pronounces words (examples: 'root','seagull') and so on, he acquires no image of these things, and therewith recognises the futility of the words uttered and consequently the futility of the words he uses to write his own life.

The problem posed by Sartre (in his novel) is two fold: on the one hand, I (speaking in the plural sense of individuals here), as reflective consciousness, perceive my freedom as limited by the gaze of the Other (with the other being my peers and all of the other "Ideological State Apparatuses)

On the other hand, it is also limited by language. Language appears as a 'medium' which 'objectifies' the consciousness of the Other and allows it to rest upon me, thereby, objectifying me. Furthermore, it is also clear that Sartre is deeply concerned with the absolute necessity for the individual to be perceived, and thereby to perceive him/herself, as a subject in the world.

In "What is Literature?", Sartre suggests that freedom is intimately bound up with the activity of the writer whose work appears to the readers in terms of a universal definition of the meaning of being, thereby freeing them. Sartre views the relationship between the writer and the reader in terms of dialectical aufheben; i.e. that the "creative freedom" of the first must be recognised and solicited by the second, such that: "The more we experience our freedom, the more we recognize that of the other; the more--(the writer), demands of us, the more (the reader) demand(s) of him."

Here, Sartre points to a mode of communication which safeguards the subjectivity of individuals involved, which he formulated in Existentialism and Humanism. Writing and reading become the medium permitting this exchange and universalization of the essence of the self. For Sartre, language "is a prolongation of the senses, a third eye which is going to look into our neighbour's heart. We are within language as within our body.

Words and writing appear as a somewhat peculiar process of 'active objectification' of the human essence; they constitute an act which captures, without altering (this is because it's not phenomenal)the meaning of freedom as both consciousness and action.

British Philosopher J.L Austin was one of the most influential intellectual figures of the 20th century. He, along with Ludwig Von Wittgenstein, revolutionised our understanding of reality by taking on metaphysics with the practice known as analytic philosophy--which starts from ordinary language, analyses its description of a situation, then shows the confusion that arises from applying language in a way that it was never intended for.

However, it should be noted that Austin never claimed that ordinary language was the final or sole arbiter of problems (hence the concept of The Coherence Theory Of Truth.)

Austin then analyses the uses of peformatives to show that they exhibit “felicity” conditions that play a role similar to that played by truth conditions with respect to constatives: instead of being meaningless, performatives require assessment conditions different from those applied to constatives.

Austin then develops a larger classification of speech acts, his famous “locutionary-illocutionary-perlocutionary” typology. In saying something, we perform a locutionary act of “uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference” an illocutionary act such as promising, ordering, warning and so on, and sometimes a perlocutionary act in which we achieve something such as convincing, persuading, or deterring.

Each of these positions focuses on certain aspects of Austin's work and develops a set of implications consonant with issues in the various disciplines, which themselves depend on views of language influenced by Ferge and Saussure. Cleaning up Austin's distinctions allows John Searle, who studied with Austin, to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of speech acts--such as promising, and to create a philosophically rigorous and scientific classifications of speech acts that he uses to explain intentionality, mental processes, and even the status of fictional discourse.

Yet most of this contemporary work derives from a core opposition that Austin isolated in his performative, constative contrast: language as truth functional, rather than language as enacting.

Austin has received his fair share of criticism, mainly for his use of analytic philosophy, and whether the method has any usefulness beyond the discovery of further subtleties in a language.

The criticisms stem out of the fact that he did develop (admittedly) inconsistent views of language; and the fact that language is not perfect, even for time hallowed purposes (particularly philosophical discussions) and even if it were, it would not suffice for the future. Advance in knowledge are usually closely coupled with refinement, extension, or revolution in language.

There is also the charge that Austin infers from a lack of usage to in-correctness or in-admissability of usage, and that it's not safe to infer from the fact that only in special circumstances will we have reason to modify a verb, to the conclusion that only in special circumstances is it correct, or meaningful, to modify.

In common with Wittgenstein - though not quite so conspicuously - the charge is that Austin failed to distinguish ways in which an expression can fail to "make sense"; that we fail to make sense of a statement need not - and often does not - mean that the statement is in any way pathological.

It may simply mean that it asserts something so obvious that we cannot imagine why anyone would bother to state it. In these cases we are not "puzzled" about what the statement means, but rather about the way it was said.

(Mean takes on many forms here, as in a more general sense than is generally intended when discussing semantics).

If a statement which "makes no sense" must have no meaning; there is the inference from the fact that an expression is rarely or never used to the claim that it is wrong or meaningless to use it.

Austin's declaration that expressions are inadmissible does appear to make language more capricious than it really is.

The thing is though, is that admissions can be inadmissible.

From the Queensland Consolidated Acts CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2003 - SECT 72

An expression of regret made by an individual in relation to an incident alleged to give rise to an action for damages at any time before a civil proceeding is started in a court in relation to the incident is not admissible in the proceeding.

So if, for example, a health care provider were to apologise for malpractice. The statement is inadmissible in any future proceedings against the health care provider in relation to a personal injury allegedly arising out of the procedure.

So while there may be much criticism of Austin's work, the fact is that Austin does get it right in a lot of areas, which is why I an others frequently cite his work.

Making a segue way into Wittgenstein: as he wrote in Tractatus 1.1, the world consists entirely of facts. Human beings are aware of the facts by virtue of our mental representations or thoughts, which are most fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are.

These thoughts are, in turn, expressed in propositions, whose form indicates the position of these facts within the nature of reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth conditions under which they correspond to that reality.

Everything that is true - that is, all the facts that constitute the world - can, in principle, be expressed by what are known as "atomic sentences". They would picture all of the facts there are, and this would be an adequate representation of the world as a whole.

The tautological expressions of logic occupy a special role in this language scheme. Because they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally nonsense: they convey no information about what the facts truly are. But since they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies reveal the underlying structure of all language, though, and reality. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the most significan logical feature of the world are not - in themselves - additional facts about it.

This is the major theme of the Tractatus as a whole: since propositions merely express facts about the world, propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value. The facts are just the facts. Everything else, everything about which we care, everything that might render the world meaningful, must reside elsewhere.

A properly logical language, Wittgenstein held, deals only with what is true. Aesthetic judgements about what is beautiful and ethical judgements about what is good cannot even be expressed within the logical language, since they transcend what can be pictured in thought. They aren't facts. The achievement of a wholly satisfactory description of the way things are would leave unanswered (but also, questions that cannot be asked) all of the most significant questions with which traditional philosophy was concerned.

By the time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1928, he had begun to question the truth of his earlier pronouncements. One of the problems with logical analysis is that is demands too much precision, both in the definition of words, and in the representation of a logical structure. In ordinary language, application(s) of a word often, only bear a "family resemblance" to each other, and a variety of grammatical forms may be used to express the same basic thought. But under these conditions, Wittgenstein now realised the hope of developing an ideal formal language that accurately pictures the world is not only difficult to achieve, but wrong-headed.

The picture theory of meaning, and logical atomism are untenable - Wittgenstein now maintained - and there is no reason to hope that any better versions of these basic positions will ever come along. Claims to have achieved a correct, final analysis of language are invariably mistaken.

Since philosophical problems arise from intellectual bewilderment, induced by the misuse of language, the only way to resolve them is to use examples from ordinary language to deflate pretensions of traditional thought. The only legitimate role for philosophy, then, is as a kind of therapy for the bewilderment of human thought by philosophical language. Careful attention to the actual usage of ordinary language should help avoid the conceptual confusions that give rise to the traditional difficulties that accompany language.

It is misleading to even attempt to fix the meaning of particular expressions by linking them referentially to things in the world. The meaning of a word, or phrase, or proposition is nothing other than the set of informal rules governing the use of expression in our actual life.

And thus brings us to Wittgenstein's theory of "Language as a game", where he argued that the rules for the use of ordinary language are neither right or wrong, or true or false; they are merely useful for the particular applications in which we apply them. Human beings at large constitute a greater community within which similar - though more widely shared - language games, subject to the nuances of a particular ethno-centric environment, are played.

An example of a language game: Arithmetic. Arithmetic, Wittgenstein, supposed, and the fundamental truths that accompany it are nothing more than relatively stable ways of playing a particular language game. Wittgenstein's account rejects both the logicist and intuitionist views of mathematics, in favour of a normative conception of its usage. To him, 2 3 = 5 is nothing other than a way we have collectively decided to speak and write, a handy, shared, language game.

The concept of the language game can be applied to how we relay private inner experiences, such as pain. It would be possilbe to represent them in a corresponding language. Upon detailed examination, however, he concluded that the very notion of such a private language is utterly nonsensical.

If any of the experiences (in regards to pain) were entirely private, then the pain that I feel would surely be amongst them. Yet, commonly, other people are said to know when I am in pain. Indeed, Wittgenstein pointed out that I would never have learned the meaning of the word "pain" without the aid of other people, none of whom have access to the supposed private sensations of pain that I feel.

For the word "pain" to have any meaning at all presupposes some sort of external verification, a set of criteria for its correct application, and they must be accessible to others as well as to myself. Thus, the traditional way of speaking about pain (according to him) needs to be abandoned, altogether.

Notice that exactly the same kind of argument will work with respect to every other attempt to speak about supposedly inner experiences. There is no systematic way to coordinate the use of words that express sensations of any kine with the actual sensations that are supposed to occure within myself, and other agents.

Wittgenstein proposed that we imagine that each human being carries a tiny box whose contents are to be observed, only by it owner. Example: even if we all agree to use the word "beetle" to refer to what is in the box, there is no way to establish a non-linguistic similarity between the contents of my own box, and the contents of someone else's. Just so, the use of language for pains or other sensation can only be associated successfully without dispositions to behave in certain ways.

Pain is whatever makes someone writhe and groan. Pain is what makes us human.

Wittgenstein does have a point in that, when you express your pain aloud, it becomes a public language. And whilst it is difficult to say for certain whether Wittgenstein's views are fundamentally behaviourist, they do seem to be open to similar objections. The most important of thise is that the way that someone behaves is no guarantee of their mental state - i may express my being in pain differently to you without being mad, or dysfunctional, in any other way.

Another criticism is that the problem of other minds seems to be untouched. It is all very well to say that language and meaning are, to some extent, public, but this does not bring us any closer to establishing some criterion for the presence of mind in others. Another criticism is that the problem of other minds seems to be untouched.

I suppose the problem remains 'untouched' because, even though other seem to behave as if they are conscious, in the same way we are, we cannot know what it is like to be them. In the end, the problem of other minds seems to come down to the problem of consciousness (which opens up a whole new can of worms best left to another post....)

Making a segue way, the "Language as a game rules" can be applied to theology, as well. Maimonides follows the Islamic Neoplatonic tradition of envisioning God as the purest of unlimited being, a kind of pure being which is so utterly unified that It transcends any internal divisions.

It is this radical sense of unity which accounts for Maimonides' strong, negative theology. Since God is utterly and absolutely unified, He is a subject about whom we can predicate nothing; since; afterall, predication implies - of a subject - that he is one thing or another, thus suggesting some limitation. As such, God, as subject, transcends the normal parameters of language and conceptualisation.

To approach God apophatically is, hence, to approach God with a heightened sensitivity to the failures of language hence, is to say very much about Him at all. “Negative theology”, as it is known, states that claims about God - with the exception of the claim "that He exists" - are seen as never actually telling us anything substantive about God.

For Maimonides, language is limited in its ability to capture God's essence: “when the tongues aspire to magnify Him by means of attributive qualifications, all eloquence turns into weariness and incapacity!”.

It is in this vein that Maimonides takes great pains to point out how the Bible itself, in its various, detailed, positive attibutions about God, is not to be taken at face value (which it shouldn't be, hence the concept of exegesis). Maimonides explains that Biblical descriptions of divine traits are not to be seen as telling us anything about God's essential reality, but rather:

…the numerous attributes possessing diverse notions that figure in the Scripture and that are indicative of Him, may he be exalted, are mentioned in reference to the multiplicity of His actions and not because of a multiplicity subsisting in His essence, and some of them, as we have made clear, also with a view to indicating His perfection according to what we consider as perfection.

To describe God is, here, to describe the effects God's being has on (or in) the world of humans. If we speak of God's mercy, we are speaking not of God's essence, per se, but of the merciful ways in which God's being is manifest itself in the world-manifest; that is, as activity, in this world.

In other words? While words can describe most of the world around us, there are some things that are beyond description, and that are better felt, than analysed.

Aside from that, the role of words, in general, whether it's the subliminal messaging in advertising, which --as Fox Mulder said-- seem to produce a specific timbre or cadence in someone's voice that triggers something inside of us, or the inflection in someone's voice that reaches down to the inner depth of your soul and lifts you to your highest high (listen to the live version of La Solitudine by Laura Pausini), words play an integral part in shaping the world around us.

In the book (and the film adaptation) The Hucksters, the character Evan Llewelyn Evans - during a board room meeting - spits on the boardroom table to illustrate a point in mnemonics. The point that Evans was trying to make is, that an act - however gross it might be - is burned in your mind. That image, along with the memes in the form of advertising slogans - whether catchy, or just plain annoying - seem to be burned into, and play in the ever spinning reel that is the windmill of someone's mind.

The catchy slogans, in turn, lead to more profit, as the memes exert a considerable amount of influence; even going so far as to influencing people who would have not previously thought about buying a certain product to do so.

As the Bible says, the tongue is an animal that cannot be tamed. With it, we produce both salt and fresh water, death and life. My concern with words, and the importance that they have have led me to take up linguistics as a course, as analysing the structure of sentences, and morphological aspects of words have become of interest to me.

But I guess I'm just expatiating in a fools paradise, expecting everyone to weigh the possible consequences before they use certain words. I can't blame them for not doing so. I must admit that I myself, have been a hypocrite, at times, and used certain words without thinking, in order to wound others.

Words that may bother someone else may not bother me. When certain words are used colloquially, or in jest, I have no problem with them. When someone uses the word "ho" when joking around, I have no problem with it. It's just when it's used to demean others that I do take issue with it.

But what offends us varies, and can be just as subjective as aesthetics, or taste in certain things.

We don't control every aspect of our lives with these words, but the world is a canvas, or better yet, clay, and the words we use on a daily basis shape it.

Music: Suede, Mos Def and Talib Kweli. Because all of them have a way with words. ;)

candyy_maryy7

2008-08-01T16:41:45Z

Okay, you friended me. Can you let me know who you are? I don't let just anyone friend me; as I do have some private stuff on my LJ.

Please, give me more info on you.

nods to Shu and Aggie Tell me if we sleep together, would you be my friend forever?

2008-08-01T07:55:13Z

My Top 5

Inspired by an entry I saw on me mate Shu's blog, and tagged by Aggie (and her filthy hands :p) I've decided to post this:

List 5 celebrities you would consider having sex with without even asking questions (provided they smelled good).
2) Put all of them IN ORDER of your lust for them [5 - 1, 1 is the hottest].
3) Say which movie/show/thing it was that hooked you.
4) Supply photos for said people.
5) Tag five people

5.)Wang Lee Hom - I first heard of this bloke in a thread in the Lao Forum on the Asia's finest website. The thread linked to a Youtube vid which featured Wang doing charitable work in my native Laos. Ever since then, I've been smitten - with a bloke who can not only sing - but is charitable and compassionate, as well.

He's like the Taiwanese R. Kelly (except of course, he doesn't pee on little girls...)

Don't be afraid of love, indeed.

I'd gladly eat......

His boiled eggs any day.

4.) Justin Hartley -

My love...

I can see us holding hands
Walking on the beach our toes in the sand
I can see us in the country side
Sitting in the grass laying side by side
You can be my baby
Gonna make you my baby
Boy you amaze me
Ain't gotta do nothin crazy
See all I want you to do is be my love

*swoons*

3.) Blake Lively -

Serena Van Der Woodson is the one who reeled me into Gossip Girl, and she is what will keep me watching the show.

I just looooove blondes.

2.) Kristen Bell -

Oh Veronica....

Logan doesn't deserve you. And I can tell by the femme slashy subtext in the show that you had something going on with Lilly.

So please - start something with me?

1.) Tiziano Ferro -

Ti amo, TZN.

He's a handsome guy - who makes great music and sings in a romantic language. What's not to love?!

He is - and will be - my future husband.

(And he will once that judge lifts the pesky order that says I have to stay at least 500 feet away from him at all times...)

Honourable mentions:

Penn Badgley - I can't blame Serena for choosing Dan over Nate (D/S shipper for life! )

Aaliyah - I know she's dead, but I'm used to corpses (screw you Sabrinaset 3!)

And of course, the hottest motherfucker evar:

http://forums.comicbookresources.com/showthread.php?p=7000246#post7000246

So there you have it. My list.

Music: Sugar Walls by Sheena Easton.

*nods to HeyStacy*, Because I'm still laughing my ass off at the image of "The Diva" coming onto someone while singing this song (>=p):

Oh, and to the haters:

GET A FUCKING LIFE.

The only reason why I keep my page public is cos you need something to do.

A change of heart: I've been doing some thinking.

2008-07-30T11:25:31Z

As an Asian American of Lao descent, (Lao - not Hmong) I must say that after doing some thinking, I am deeply ashamed of and feel profound regret over the plight of the Hmong still hiding in the jungles of Laos.

I decided to join a group on Facebook dedicated to raising awareness of the plight of the Hmong because I think it's wrong that these people are being treated this way, and I want to do something about it.

The only two things that I have a problem with is when people apply the label "ethnic cleansing" to the situation. It bothers me because 'ethnic cleansing' is the systematic, and institutionalised policy of destroying a whole race, not a small subset of people.

While the plight of the "jungle" Hmong is of concern, the rest of the Hmong in Laos - are free to go about their way of life.

A few links to read and consider:

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/19086.htm

http://www.nnn.se/n-model/foreign/hmong.htm

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/8ee400b5f40030eac12571fb004f5fc5/$FILE/G0643847.doc

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA26/003/2007/en/dom-ASA260032007en.html

http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/ASA26/005/2006/en/dom-ASA260052006en.html

While all fivelinks acknowledge the plight of the remnants left in the jungle, the first two links dispute the claims of genocide - while the third and fourth links avoid using the term.

My objection may just be a semantic quibbling over pro-nouns; as the situation of not just the Hmong, but for the minorities of Laos in general is not comparable to the Rwanda, nor what happened in The Balkans during the 1990s.

What happened in the two aforementioned countries was systematic, with the repercussions of a large number of individuals.

I also dispute the claims that it is somehow in the Lao government's interest to wipe out minorities in general - or that it is somehow a stated policy agenda; as there is not enough evidence to support the claim.

Add to that the fact that minorities have been incorporated into all levels of Lao society, including the national parliament.

It should also be kept in mind that there are around 400,000 Hmong in Laos, and only a few thousand of them are left hiding in the jungles.

Hence why--although I am sympathetic to the plight of those in the jungle--the fact that it is only a few thousand; as opposed to whole entire group--makes me reluctant to refer to it as a 'ethnic cleansing'.

The fact that it's only a few thousand does, in no way, diminish their suffering, and make their situation any less urgent.

I guess what we have here is conflicting reports on what is essentially complicated issue, and the conflicting reports do make things a bit more complicated.

It is difficult to confirm the claims by either side. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two sets of figures given by the government and by Hmong refugees.

An estimated 300,000 Hmong refugees have fled Laos since the year 1975.

The Lao government appears to have made a genuine attempt to incorporate minority groups into the new People's Democratic Republic of Laos, at least in so far as policy-making is concerned.

Though that is the official policy, the government has gone about it in a clumsy manner; often times, the policies have ended up hurting more than helping.

Add to that the distinction and subsequent classifications of ethnic groups practising slash-and-burn agriculture on hillsides and speaking Austro-Asiatic and Mon-Khmer languages are called Lao Theung, or "Lao of the mountain slopes". At even higher altitudes, the Lao Sung, or the "Lao of the mountaintops", cultivate hill paddies as well as opium poppies and speak Hmong- Yao and Sino-Tibetan languages. Together the Lao Lum comprise some 56% of the total population of 5.3 million, the Lao Theung (34%), and the Lao Sung, make up 9% of the population.

This classification was initiated in the 1950s by the then Royal Lao Government and is still being used today in the communist-run Lao People's Democratic Republic, although its founder, Kaysone Phomvihane, once deemed ethnic categorization to be anti-revolutionary.

Michael Foucalt once posited that race was a way for "The Power" to treat the population as a mixture of races--or, to be more accurate, to 'subdivide' us into 'subspecies' known as 'races'. To him, it was the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum, addressed by power.

Foucalt also posited that it was a way for the "Power" to convince us that war is a good thing--as on the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship (i.e, death of another guarantees my safety.)

While I think that Foucalt may be a bit extreme in his views (simple prejudice does not always lead to murder), he does have a point that these distinctions may be a way for the "Power" to remain in power, and the harm they may (intentionally, or not) cause.

Classifications, such as the one implemented by The Royal Lao Government, may have unintentionally created an 'us/them' barrier, making reconciliation between all parties more difficult.

(Though it should be noted that stereotypes and prejudice existed long before the implementation of such categorisations.)

Those displaced by the war prior to the 1973 ceasefire either have returned to their old settlements, or were resettled into new villages.

During the years that followed the Vietnam War, the capitalist economy in Laos suffered as a result of the war, and thus led to a severing of almost all trading links with the domestic highlands.

The results of such actions led to severe economic hardship for all of Laos 49 minorities, including the Hmong.

These difficulties have been partly due to environmental destruction by the war, and the lack of human and natural resources.

Even Kaysone Phomvihane (headed the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, was born in December 13, 1920, died November 21, 1992) admitted: "insufficient practical experience in socialist transformation and construction" have played a role in the inability to raise the standard of living in the country.

There continue to be sporadic anti-government activities in different parts of the country. The insurgents, however, do not appear to have enough armour to legitimately overthrow the government.

Nonetheless, the government still has to contend with the remnants left over from the Vietnam War.

Strategies used to win their support have included leaflet drops, radio appeals (both in the Hmong language) and relocation of formerly inaccessible villages.

Official publications such as the KPL Bulletin Quotidian and Sieng Pasason often encourage cadres and state employees at the provincial/state levels to pay special attention to the needs of minorities--in order to raise political awareness to raise their political consciousness and to ensure the distribution of necessary goods.

These official policies appear to had some effect where the Hmong have been traditionally on the side of the Pathet Lao. They have chosen to remain behind, as opposed to seeking asylum in other countries.

A number of refugees have returned voluntarily to Laos, but it is not known just how many have. Some reports (mainly anecdotal) have suggested that they have been well received and have encountered no official reprisals. However, that is not always the case.

Several emergent factors have led to exodus of refugees that continue to flow over the Thai border, among them being the military draft, the rice tax, and simple poverty.

Beginning in the year 1975, the Pathet Lao set out to re-pay those who had supported their struggle to power by developing the remote mountainous areas.

The aforementioned Kaysone Phomvihane, promised the minorities of what was then referred to as "East Salavanh" their own province. In 1984, his promise came to fruition, as he followed through on his word and created the province of Xekong.

The main Laos government strategy is to develop remote areas has been to push for "economic integration". This has translated into a policy of swidden agriculture eradications, which is commonly put forward as an important way to develop the uplands. Following the common government line, swidden is focused on producing a diversity of crops for subsistence. The end result is--instead of eradicating poverty, as is the stated goal, this keeps ethnic minorities poor, especially where fallow cycles are being reduced.

The policy was to teach them how to farm like low land Lao people-- to focus on a narrow range of crops in order to produce a surplus which will generate cash, increase market linkages, and uplift them our of poverty.

Recognizing that many upland areas are unsuitable for paddy cultivation, and given the remoteness of so much of areas like Xekong, an estimated 100-200 groups have been resettled over the past two decades - with varying levels of compliance, or resistance, from these groups.

The results have rarely been beneficial for the repatriated parties. In most cases, the actual move has not been assisted by the federal government, and villages have had to leave behind their most vital belongings.

Once they have moved to a new site, there is often no help for them to restart. Whole villages have been uprooted and then told to build their own new houses for settlement, and clear new land for cultivation--often with no assistance.

The new villages often face new obstacles, including neighbours who resent the migrants being given land that formerly belonged to them, food shortages, and exposure to diseases such as malaria, and poverty; both of the material and cultural variety.

The hardships have led some Hmong to turn to things such as heroin to numb the pain, with opium being a crop they had learned how to cultivate, long before their migration from China.

The crisis that hit the Asian financial markets during the late nineties also played a role in this. Until then, Laos had benefited from the free market reforms and foreign investment - mainly from Thailand. Like most other 'communist' countries that have liberalised their markets; the country remained socialist in name only. But -although the markets were liberalised - the political system never was, and a lack of transparency and accountability exacerbated Laos' difficulties.

Foreign investment declined as investors pulled out, and -in early 1997 - the Laotian currency (the kip) fell from 1,080 to the dollar to as low as 10,000. It was the biggest depreciation in the region. Laos also became the only member of ASEAN to suffer triple digit inflation. According to the IMF, in Vientiane, annual inflation rose from 26% in December 1997 to 142% a year later, before peaking at 167% in March 1999.

Private savings were wiped out, and government employees lost up to 80% of their purchasing power.

The situation was brought under control in late 1999 by a range of austerity measures, including salary caps, and high interest rates. The exchange rate has bottomed out at 7,500 kip to the dollar, and inflation eventually dwindled down to a manageable 10%.

Still, problems remain, though it is heartening to note that a significant amount of growth has occurred in the Laos economy.

During the five-year period between the years 2001-2005, the Lao economy has maintained rapid and sustainable growth. On average, the GDP grew at about 6.24 percent per annum, which is about 0.3 percentage point higher than the average growth rate in the previous five-year period (1996-2000). That is due, in large part to reforms in the area of agriculture.

However slow the process maybe, it is heartening to note that the growth rate achieved is higher than that recorded in the previous Plan period (1996-2000). It is useful to highlight the relative growth rates of: domestic private sector output, output from FDI enterprises, and State output. This was possible - in spite of the domestic and international constraints - thanks to the tremendous efforts of the people, the Government, and the National Party. Furthermore, the average economic growth rate in the Lao PDR during the past five years is among the highest in the region.

In 2008, the growth rate was 7.00 %, while the official exchange rate being $4.008 billion in 2007.

Still, Laos remains the poorest country in South East Asia, and has even been classified as 'fourth world'.

International rankings for Laos:

Heritage Foundation/The Wall Street Journal, Index of Economic Freedom: 149 out of 157

Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index: 156 out of 167

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index: 111 out of 163

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index: 130 out of 177

These hardships have naturally, led to internal strife. On 26 of October 1999, a group of teachers and students from Dongdok University in Vientiane, led by a local lecturer, Thongpaseuth Keuakhone, staged a demonstration against the government. It was the first such incident since the communists took over the country.

The demonstration was quickly suppressed, and Thongpaseuth (the leader of the protest) and his fellow demonstrators were quickly rounded up, and incarcerated. The quick suppression of the demonstration ensured that few in Laos were aware of the events that had taken place. The incident was soon followed by a marked increase in the number of political seminars, where officials and others had to study the doctrines of the ruling communist party.

The political seminars - which are exercises in party indoctrination - pose another threat as well, as assimilation (and ultimately, homogenisation) brings with it the threat of losing the core values of a culture, in order to conform.

Young people were summoned by local community leaders and told not to listen to "counter revolutionaries."

A leaflet distributed by the protesters prior to apprehension, outlined the basic demands of Laos fledgling pro-democracy movement: political reform, the release of all political prisoners, and a return to the 1974 coalition government, which included communist as well as neutralist forces.

The last demand, which was far more conciliatory than the usual hard line approach of certain members of the Lao exile community, is taken by some to be a clear indication that Thongpaseuth's protest was a genuinely indigenous movement, and not orchestrated from abroad.

Dissent within the lowland Lao, the country's ethnic majority, is seen as even more threatening than insurgent activities among the tribal population, but even in the hills, conflict is brewing.

Hmong hill tribe 'insurgents' have been reported attacking towns such as Khoun on the Plain of Jars, killing six people and burning several buildings. Skirmishes have also been reported from the Saysomboun area just south of the Plain of Jars, and around Udomxay in the north west. Eyewitnesses have observed military cargo planes and convoys of ground troops head for the affected areas.

There have even been reports of meetings between Vang Pao and Prince Soulivong Savang, meetings that occurred years before Vang Pao's arrest last year.

Prince Soulivong has appealed to the United States to help "negotiate a transition to democracy" in Laos, and has gained support from US politicians sympathetic to his cause.

So; we know what the problem is. So how do we set about fixing it? As I noted on my MySpace blog: The best way to end this conflict is to put outside pressure on the Laos government, and to get Laos to open up. Sending mediators into the jungle would help, as well as investment in the Laos economy. Investment - as well as movements such as Solidarity in Poland - and Gorbachev implementing perestroika and glasnost, are what led to the downfall of the Soviet Union.

China is beginning to open up more as a result of the country's unprecedented growth. I would like to see the same thing happen in Laos.

And may it happen soon, as time may be running out for those who need help the most.

Staring At The Sun: Looking For The Wider Picture

2008-07-22T02:10:20Z

I'm just posting here to say that I know that I've been writing a lot of depressing stuff as of late. The thing is, while it is good to vent, I tend to get caught up in the drama--so much so that I fail to see the wider picture.

I guess it's just easy to get caught up when you're going through it. The trick is to not let it blind you, and to not let the demons drag you down.

The thing is--to contradict myself-- I often complain about how the media tends to focus on trivial nonsense, while neglecting what's important. Stories about the latest misdeeds of some celebrity who possess an empty head (and no soul) get more airtime than let's say, stories about the Ituri Conflict (which has taken over 50,000 lives) in the country of Congo.

I just find that disheartening, while the fact that malaria infects between 300 and 500 million people every year and accounts for up to 2.7 million deaths annually, does not receive just as much attention.

I liken it to the film "Wag The Dog", which was a film that satirising how Americans easily buy into kitsch, and have the attention spans of ferrets with add.

The sad thing is, there is some truth to that statement.

The plank is in there eyes, and mine as well.

To get all philosophical for a second here; spatio temporal wise, when we are caught up in the moment, it certainly does make us myopic (at least for that period and time.) Spatial-temporal reasoning is the ability to visualize spatial patterns and mentally manipulate them over a time-ordered sequence of spatial transformations. If only we could control all of the spatio patterns that form in our mind.

The thing is; we can't. In terms of volitionalism; we are free to make decisions, but not as free as the radical libertarians would like to think we are.

In other words? There are some things that we can't control. It's okay to think about them--and to be dismayed by them--but not to obsess over them.

Don't let your life pass you by.

As I think about these things--and my dark and twisty past-- it's all right to be disheartened by them, but not to let the grief get to the point where it paralyses me.

There's an insect in your ear if you scratch it won't disappear
It's gonna itch and burn and sting
Do you want to see what the scratching brings
Waves that leave me out of reach
Breaking on your back like a beach...
Will we ever live in peace?
Cause those that can't do often have to
Those that can't do often have to... preach

To the ones staring at the sun...
Afraid of what you'll find if you took a look inside
Not just deaf and dumb... staring at the sun
I'm not the only one who'd rather go blind

You're not the only one, Paul Hewson.

As the Japanese say: "Even if you can't let go of yesterday... I'll still be there to meet you tomorrow."

Like Miranda Bailey said; look for the wider picture.

My So Called Really Boring Life

2008-07-05T21:13:14Z

I haven't updated my LJ in over two weeks. Why? First of all, just chalk it up to laziness, and procrastination.

But mainly, it's because my life is really boring. I've been on summer vacation for about a month, and I have nothing of interest to write about, mainly because I've been lying about the house all day--like a bored housewife, or a cat.(No difference really...>:))

I've been so bored that I've taken to watching re-runs of various Opening Ceremonies of the Olympic games, and videos about the paranormal on youtube.

Needless to say; I need to get out more.

The only two things worthy of note (at least in my eyes) that have taken place are:

1.) I was sick for a few days last week. I'm not sure just what brought about the sickness. I guess it must have been an allergy to a product I used to clean my room--or bad Mexican food (as Mexican is the only thing I've been eating as of late.) Whatever caused it, it gave me dizzy spells where I constantly had to lie down. I also had trouble eating, as I ended up regurgitating a lot of what I had digested. Whatever it was, I'm glad it's gone.

2.) Old Wounds: With the recent death of a mother of a friend of mine, I've been thinking a lot about mortality and sickness as of late.

Even though I didn't know my friend's mother too well; her death ripped open some old wounds that I had been nursing, and brought back old memories. Last year, I had lost someone I was close too. I found out six months after her death.

About a year before her death, I had lost contact with her. I just stopped interacting with her on regular intervals, as life got in the way. And then she was gone.

To this day, I regret the fact that I never got to re-establish contact with her before she died.

You think you have forever, but you don't.

*Moving on before the lachrymal starts..*

I've also been worried about my own mum's health. She's been sick for over four months. I'm not sure what it is specifically; it's some cough related to her asthma. Whatever it is, I hope it just goes away.

More random rambles: What is wrong with Fan Forums?! Good God, the server errors are becoming quite frequent, and just plain REALLY FUCKING ANNOYING!!!!

Good God, I hate bands like Evanescence, and groups that sound like them. I was doing just fine, listening to the music on the radio (which I rarely do, because radio in the States just plain sucks) until I came across some act (I don't know the name--don't particularly care) that performed the same, metal lite toss that Evanescence does, with lyrics that were sung by a woman whose voice rose a bit too high for my liking. It was a moment worthy of the phrase "grit my teeth", mainly because that's exactly what it made me do.

As for music I've been listening too as of late; I've been listening to a diverse array of musical acts. In addition to what I usually listen to-- I've also been listening to Corinne Bailey Rae, Lao and Thai hip hop, to the music of the early Sixties (Shelly Faberas, Marcy Blane, The Four Seasons) and British Sea Power.

The Four Seasons are the one act I've been playing the most. There's just something magical about their manufactured innocence.

I've also been listening to Chris Brown a lot. I just think he's cute and his music's great. I don't care what anyone says--as there is nothing wrong with liking music that has basic strophic forms. After all; the music of Holland/Dozier and Motown in general, as well as the stuff produced in the Brill Building is held in high esteem, is it not?

I've also began listening to Aesop Rock. That man is an amazing, and brilliant MC. His lyrics are more like poems than just your standard old lyrics prose. The best example of that is the song "Coffee", a tune that I absolutely love, and have been playing on a consistent basis.

I've also started to write fan fic, inspired by both Veronica Mars and Grey's Anatomy. It's entitled Sometimes You Can't Make It On Your Own. I won't publish it until I finish the entire thing, and --I'm being generous here--it'd probably be done by the end of the year. Heh.

=p

The final thing of note in my life is the fact that I've decided to switch colleges. I will attend a new one in the fall. It is one that is closer to my home, therefore allowing me to reduce the amount of time it takes me to commute to school, and will allow me to save money on gas. I look forward to it, though I'll admit that I hate trying to make new friends, and being a stranger in a strange land.

(But then again, I've also been having trouble with some of my so called friends as of late, as well...)

That's it for now.

Chat with you again LaterZ.

Mmmm...

Coffee!

What The Hell And Why Not:

2008-06-17T11:14:19Z

I've been subjected to fookin' memes, mate.

Here I am, thinkin' I'm a fookin' individual, when the truth is--I've been subjected to the same constructs, and find myself chasin' after what a lot of other people are doin'.

Why am I fookin' sayin' all of this?

Because I've taken a cue from me mates and decided to get into the que, and post this:

If you read this, if your eyes are passing over this right now, even if we don't speak often, please post a comment with a memory of you and me. It can be anything you want - good or bad. When you're finished, post this little paragraph on your blog and be surprised (or mortified) about what people remember about you.

Now comment you blighters and sods, as I've commented on your entries!

*Realises she's been posting in a Mancunian accent*

AIIIEEEEEE!!!!

*Goes back to speaking in normal English--and by normal English, she means a bastardized version which encompasses American and UK colloquialisms, and idioms (and screws some of them up, right proper)*

MAD FER IT!